The international interconnectedness and interdependence increase the necessity for multilateral cooperation. The basic work conducted in the UN with regard to security and humanitarian issues, environment, development and human rights are thus gaining in importance. Several topics merit to be mentioned in our context: first the subjects directly relevant to security policy, such as terrorism, organised crime and the traffic in drugs, where the UN endeavours to elaborate global conventions, to establish the exchange of information and to build up instruments; secondly the area of migration and disaster relief where the UN has created additional structures for early warning and for operations. The UN has met the increased challenges by initiating a process of comprehensive reforms intended to improve its capacity for action.
Membership of European and North-American states in international organisations
3.2.2. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in EuropeThe Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the most comprehensive regional organisation for common security and political consultations. It unites North America, Europe and the Central Asian former Soviet Republics in an area of cooperative security. Cooperation within the OSCE, and OSCE activities, are based on shared values, including human rights and basic liberties, democracy and the rule of law. The organisation's decisions are not binding under international law, but they are politically binding and establish standards of behaviour.
The core of the OSCE activities of the OSCE includes preventive diplomacy, the prevention of conflicts, crisis management and its contribution to the strengthening of democratic societies after conflicts. This is underpinned by a interconnected political, military, economic and ecological factors. The security of all partners shall be strengthened through cooperation.
In the civilian domain of OSCE activities, the main focus is on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and the monitoring of elections. The OSCE has considerably enhanced its operational capabilities. It can intervene in areas of crisis or tension with short-term and long-term missions and thereby contribute to the management of crises or the post-conflict normalisation.
Confidence- and security-building measures are cornerstones of the military domain of the OSCE. They serve to promote openness, transparency and previsibility regarding armed forces, to reduce tension, and to strengthen mutual trust by the exchange of information, mechanisms for crisis management and various forms of verification.
Switzerland supports in particular an improved compliance with OSCE commitments and a further strengthening of the organisation in order to improve cooperation and to be able better to cope with new risks and challenges, especially minority issues.
3.2.3. European Union and Western European Union
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Western European Union
With the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) the European Union created the basis for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the longer term, a common defence policy of the European Union is also envisaged; it could include operational defence structures. This process can result in the integration of the Western European Union (WEU) in the European Union or the WEU's replacement by a new structure.
With the CFSP, the European Union intends to complement the role and importance it has achieved in economic matters with a similar importance in foreign policy. Decisions are taken in the framework of cooperation between governments with equal rights. The supreme body for decisions is the European Council. All decisions on principles and for decisions with military or defence implications must be adopted by consensus. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997 strengthens the EU's capability to act in foreign and security policy since an abstention by individual states does in principle no longer block any decision. An member state abstaining from voting and formally explaining the reasons for the abstention is not obliged to carry out the decision in question („constructive abstention"). This mechanism facilitates the participation in the CFSP especially for neutral states. Moreover, the veto power is maintained if one or several member states claim that important national interests are involved.
Foreign and security policy were so far national domains of the member states. The transition to a common policy is an extended process. However, due to the dynamic development of the European Union it can be expected that the EU will gradually come closer to this objective in the coming years. In view of the political-military challenges in Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo), the member states - especially the larger ones - are increasing their insistence on the establishment of an operational defence structure and the authority for operations in crisis management. At the same time, the neutral members of the EU and Denmark insist on the preservation of their rights in joint decision-making in the CFSP. The dispute between these two basic lines will shape the development of the CFSP.
The WEU is today both the agency of the European Union for defence affairs and the European pillar of NATO. However, it does not dispose of any own operational structures. In the framework of Combined Joint Task Forces, and with the consent of NATO, it can take recourse to NATO assets for WEU operations. The full members of the WEU are ten EU member states who are at the same time also members of NATO (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Most of the other European members of NATO (Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey) are associated members of WEU. The EU membership candidates Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia are associated partners. The neutral EU states and states members both of NATO and the EU which do not wish full membership in the WEU (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) have observer status.
Cooperation in the domain of internal security
Based on an exchange of information and experience with regard to the fight against terrorism and drugs, the cooperation of the EU member states concerning justice and home affairs has gradually been intensified. Thus the states joined in the Schengen system, which was in the past not an instrument of the European Union, have realised the free movement of persons without border controls. However, at the same time they agreed on measures for the protection of internal security, so as to compensate for the elimination of identity checks at the border. All EU member states, with the exceptions of Great Britain and Ireland, plus the EFTA and EEA states Norway and Iceland are part of the Schengen system. At present, only parts of the Schengen System are applied by and for Greece.
Core elements of the Schengen system are mutual principles regarding the immigration and residence of foreigners of third countries, a uniform visa policy and practice, standardised identity checks at the European Union's external borders, the allocation of responsibility for the processing of asylum applications, common principles for international cooperation of police and justice, and the establishment of the Schengen Information System. The latter guarantees that all Schengen states have access to the data relevant for granting immigration or residence permissions.
The most important objective of the Treaty of Amsterdam is the establishment of an area in which persons, goods and services enjoy free movement and citizens benefit from a high degree of security. The entire acquis of Schengen is incorporated into the framework of the EU. This means that since 1 May 1999, when the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, the cooperation among the thirteen signatory states of the Schengen Agreement takes place within the institutional and legal framework of the EU
3.2.4. NATO, Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
NATO is the most effective organisation for collective defence. For half a century, it has outlasted all politico-military vicissitudes, ranging from situations of severe political confrontation to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, its adversaries during the Cold War. Since 1990 the Alliance has taken the necessary steps resulting from the changed constellation of threats and dangers. This is reflected in the evolution of its missions. It maintains its traditional core mission (according to paragraph 5 of the Treaty of Washington) to defend its member states against military aggression, although the probability of such aggression has considerably declined. For several years, NATO has additionally assumed the mission of keeping or enforcing peace by military means outside the territory of its member states. Up to the spring of 1999 (Kosovo conflict) such missions were always conducted under a mandate by UN Security Council. (However, NATO has also announced its readiness to undertake missions under a OSCE mandate.). The debate whether sufficient international legitimacy can also exist in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate (e.g., in cases of genocide) is in currently in full swing in the international community.
The intention of numerous Central and Eastern Europe states to join NATO indicates that the alliance is expected to play a significant role also in the future. It is in the interest of stability and peace in the whole of Europe that the enlargement of NATO, as that of the EU, does not result in new lines of division on a continent which eliminated the Iron Curtain only one decade ago. The conclusion of a basic act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation, and the signing of a charter on partnership between NATO and Ukraine are particularly welcome, although these relationships will continue to face political tests.
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) - tailor-made multinational task forces composed of units from several branches of the armed forces - are important pillars of the new NATO command structure. They can be employed in a wide spectrum. CJTF are also a means of enabling states not members of NATO, but participating in the Partnership for Peace, to take part in peace operations led by NATO.
The activities of NATO increasingly comprise various civilian issues. NATO is the most important politico-military organisation ensuring the political and military involvement of the USA and Canada in Europe. The North Atlantic Assembly also makes a valuable contribution to the same effect.
NATO's permanent defence readiness during the Cold War benefited also Switzerland. The geographic realities, and the fact that our values are essentially the same as those of most of the alliance's members led - without any activity on our part - to NATO strengthening also the security of Switzerland. Even in the absence of a concrete military threat, NATO's commitment to strengthening peace contributes to overall European security.
With the Partnership for Peace (PfP), launched in 1994, and with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) founded in 1997, NATO created structures and forums to increase political and military cooperation in the whole of Europe and to enhance stability.
The Partnership for Peace serves to enhance the capabilities of the armed forces of the participating states to take part in humanitarian and peace supporting operations and missions of disaster relief - without affecting the sovereign right of each individual state to decide on the participation or non-participation in every concrete operation. Thus PfP is making a considerable contribution to enabling states not members of NATO to participate in operations such as IFOR/SFOR. Furthermore, PfP aims at increasing the transparency of defence budgeting and to promote the democratic control of armed forces. Finally, states participating in PfP reaffirm their commitment to core values such as democracy, respect for human rights and compliance with the principles of international law.
The Partnership's flexibility - in particular the fact that each participating state retains its full liberty to decide on the participation in each individual activity - contributes to the success of this initiative, just as the fact that participation in PfP is not a first step toward NATO membership. The increase of the PfP activities listed in annual Partnership Work Programme (by now more than 2000 per year), and the wide participation in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) are proof that the participating states make use of the Partnership for Peace.
The high-level meetings within the framework of the EAPC - two annual meetings each of the foreign and defence ministers and of the chiefs of general staff, monthly meetings at ambassadorial level - are a useful platform to voice Switzerland's interests in security policy.
3.2.5. The Council of Europe
Since its establishment in 1949, the Council of Europe stands for European fundamental values such as a pluralistic and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and the and the manifold cultural heritage. It aims at establishing closer links between its members on the basis of justice and international cooperation.
The transition in Central and Eastern Europe has confronted the Council of Europe with substantial challenges and strengthened its political and operational role. In 1989, it counted 23 members - among them Switzerland - today, there are 40 members. By admitting Central and Eastern European countries, the Council of Europe has considerably contributed to the European security architecture. Its programmes, geared to practical matters, integrate the new members in the community of democratic values and prepare the remaining non-members for membership. Thus the Council of Europe lays the foundations for a Europe of freedom and diversity through the creation of a European area of law and the comprehensive nature of its activities.
The Council of Europe's contribution to European security cooperation lies in the promotion of democracy through the application of its own normative instruments, through the review to make sure that member states comply with their obligations, and through its intergovernmental cooperation programmes. With regard to its policy in the Council of Europe, the Swiss Federal Council focuses on the consistent application of the existing norms of human rights. For this purpose the European Court of Human Rights, the political mechanisms of control of the Parliamentary Assembly, the congress of the municipalities and regions in Europe, and the Committee of Ministers are of decisive importance.
3.2.6. The position of the other neutral states in the European security structure
Other neutral states in Europe - Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden - have recently published basic documents on their security policy, indicating the nature and the extent of their adjustment to the changes in the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War. These adjustments are rooted in developments which for the most part concern also Switzerland. They are therefore of interest for our own assessment of the current situation.
These four states have much in common: their active role in the OSCE, their EU membership, their participating in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and their observer status in the Western European Union. Furthermore, they have all participated from an early stage in military UN peace-keeping missions without incurring any harm to their neutrality. This longstanding cooperative commitment for peace facilitated their adjustment to the new strategic environment.
Austria, Finland and Sweden have also decided early to take part in the Partnership for Peace and assumed a very active role in the Partnership. Finland and Sweden are coordinating their policies with the intention of achieving a full say in the planning and implementation of NATO-led peace missions to which they are making military contributions, and also with the intention of co-shaping and promoting the CFSP in „Petersberg Missions" („humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking") that cause no problems with the law of neutrality. In contrast to these two countries, the governments of which are not actively considering NATO membership, the Austrian government coalition is debating a possible NATO membership.
It is also worth noting that Finland and Sweden have, together with some NATO member states, launched and shaped the initiative for regional military cooperation with the Baltic states, and that Austria has launched an initiative for Central European cooperation in peace-keeping. Both initiatives are based on the "à-la-carte" principle known from the Partnership for Peace, thus enabling Switzerland to take part.
Finland, Austria and Sweden demonstrate that a cooperative commitment to peace is compatible with neutrality and beneficial to their security.
3.2.7. Disarmament agreements and international control measures
The most important post-war arms control and disarmament agreements Switzerland is part of deal with nuclear weapons (nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1968, in force since 1970; the convention on the prohibition of nuclear tests, signed in 1996), with biological and toxic weapons (Convention on Biological Weapons of 1972, in force since 1975) and chemical weapons (Convention on Chemical Weapons of 1993, in force since 1997).
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an important role in the implementation of the non-proliferation treaty. Non-nuclear powers have to conclude an agreement with the IAEA on the control of source material and special fissible material. These controls shall ensure that a diversion of material for the production of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices would be discovered in time. After the uncovering of the Iraqi nuclear programme, the member states decided to strengthen the IAEA verification regime.
The Convention on Biological Weapons of 1972 prohibited for the first time a whole range of weapons of mass destruction comprehensively. An additional protocol on verification measures, basically structured along the lines of the Convention on Chemical Weapons, shall complete the convention by 2001.
The Convention on Chemical Weapons, dating from 1993, has been in force since April 1997. With this convention, the prohibition of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction is for the first time supported by verification measures. The International Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague is entrusted with the verification, particularly the inspections.
These disarmament measures are complemented by three international bodies dealing with control measures regarding weapons of mass destruction: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australian Group (for biological and chemical weapons) and the Missile Technology Control Regime. These bodies have in common that they determine control measures for certain commodities that may be exported. These measures are not legally binding, but commit the participants politically. The Wassenaar Agreement supplements these three export control regimes. By means of increasing transparency and harmonisation of export regulations, states posing a serious threat to regional and supra-regional security due to their arms build-up shall be prevented from acquiring conventional weapons, other military goods and dual-use goods for the production of conventional weapons. Switzerland participates in all four export control regimes.
Arms control and disarmament agreements which are open but to a limited number of states and in which Switzerland is not participating, are also contributing to the security in our region. Among them are above all several agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on strategic weapons, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe which are of utmost importance for global and continental stability.
3.2.8. Further structures relevant to security policy
Political, social and economic stability are closely interconnected. Democracy is as endangered in an insecure economic and social environment as is the development of market economy in a country without adequate provisions, and institutions, for the rule of law. Various international organisations, particularly of the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions, make important contributions in these fields for the general prevention of conflict.
For instance, the UN Development Programme supports in Eastern Europe a programme for the strengthening of democracy, good government and the citizens' involvement in public affairs. With regard to environmental issues, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE/UNO) promotes the process of „environment for Europe" intended to overcome the appalling environmental legacies of the former regimes. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) contributes significantly to the restructuring of the relationship between employers and employees and the concepts of vocational training in the transition from a planned economy to a social market economy. The World Health Organisation (WHO) is particularly active in public health, and thus in the struggle against declining life expectancy and quality of life.
The major international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group and the regional development banks, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), greatly contribute to economic stabilisation, the development and the reconstruction of countries and regions.
3.3. Risks and opportunities for the security of Switzerland
The range of threats and dangers is wide and complex. In the past, the threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty was pre-eminent; today it is primarily the threat to the functioning of society and the state as institution providing protection. These risks can no longer be met autonomously. However, manifold and partly very flexible multilateral security structures enable today Switzerland to safeguard its interests more efficiently than it could do by relying on autonomous measures.
Switzerland's increasing cooperation in European and international security structures creates new opportunities to safeguard our interests. The slight loss of freedom of action due to a membership is more than compensated by the security benefit. Even regarding organisations Switzerland is not member of, Switzerland lives already today in some respects in accordance with their principles and measures. Moreover, Switzerland contributes also financially to them. However, we cannot fully participate in setting their course. Full co-determination would obviate Switzerland's increasing dilemma of being excluded from multilateral decisions while at the same time having to bear their consequences. The autonomous re-enactment is less and less satisfactory. Cooperation in security policy with friendly states facilitates also getting closer to the European Union without prejudicing the issue of EU membership.
Furthermore, the concrete benefits which Switzerland derives from the involvement of the international community in favour of stability in Europe and the world suggest to make a greater contribution, in line with our capacities, to these politico-military activities. Particularly in recent times it became obvious that a country's overall international solidarity record is taken into account by its partners; a country will not be exempted from co-responsibility in other areas just because of its good record in a specific area (e.g., the humanitarian area for Switzerland). Outstanding achievements in a specific area are only then a convincing argument for favours to be rendered in return if the entire "solidarity balance sheet" fits the expectations.
We witness a special constellation of security policy. The conventional military threat has decreased. At the same time other, partly non-military, threats and dangers have increased, the fight against which requires that we join our efforts with those of the international community. Just at the time when international cooperation in security policy has become more necessary than ever, numerous opportunities have, due to the political developments, opened up for Switzerland to realise such cooperation. Strategic necessity and strategic opportunity complement one another perfectly.
4. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
According to article 2 of the Federal Constitution, the Swiss Confederation shall protect the liberty and the rights of the people, and shall ensure the independence and security of the country. It shall promote the common welfare, the sustainable development, the inner cohesion, and the cultural diversity of the country. To the extent possible, it shall ensure equal opportunities for all citizens. It shall strive to secure the long-term preservation of natural resources, and to promote a just and peaceful international order.
It is our interests which are decisive for the orientation shaping of our security policy. This means the maintenance of democratic values and peace in Europe, stability in the whole strategically relevant geographic environment, as little use of force as possible within and outside our borders, and secure resources for our population through the assured continued functioning of vitally important systems in Switzerland, in Europe and globally.
From the Constitution and these interests, we derive the following objectives of security policy:
* We want to decide ourselves in liberty on our own affairs, without being affected by the threat or use of direct or indirect force.
In normal situations, we want to ensure this maximum independence and freedom of action by political means. It is perfectly compatible with this objective to enter international commitments if we arrive at the conviction, after careful consideration and by democratic procedure, that these commitments serve the interests of the people and of the state. However, we rule out to surrender under pressure or force the right to decide on our own affairs. If direct or indirect force is threatened or used against Switzerland or its democratic institutions, we shall defend the integrity of our territory as well as the further national interests with all adequate means at our disposal.
* We want to preserve and protect our population and its resources from existential dangers.
On one hand, we have to protect the population from distress of great magnitude, e.g. resulting from natural and man-made disasters, and assist the population so affected in overcoming such events. On the other hand, and oriented toward the longer term, we have to protect the population's resources. They include the supply of food, energy and raw materials, a functioning economy supporting the welfare of the entire people, unimpeded access to international markets as well as an intact national and international infrastructure and environment. The preservation and protection of these resources are to a great extent dealt with by other policies (e.g., economic, social, environmental, transport, energy and communications policy) and not by security policy.
* We want to contribute to stability and peace beyond our borders and to the building of an international community of democratic values in order to reduce the risk that Switzerland and its population themselves could be affected by the consequences of instability and war abroad, and in order to demonstrate our international solidarity.
Stability and peace are best guaranteed if internationally those values are shared and lived, and those structures and institutions have an important role which Switzerland supports. They include democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, but also a just economic order conducive to general prosperity. It is therefore imperative for us to generally promote these values, structures and institutions and - in cases of acute threats to stability and peace - to support attempts at lasting solutions of conflicts. The guidelines for our commitment are our legitimate self-interest and our international solidarity.
5. STRATEGY
5.1. Core strategy and strategic guidelines
The strategy of security policy of Switzerland covers the basic reasoning, acting and behaviour regarding issues of security policy. It comprises the comprehensive use of our capabilities for the prevention of force as well as the use of all adequate civilian and military assets against the actual threat and use of force which threatens our country, its population and its resources to a significant (strategic) extent. In this context, we do not envisage just the worst case of direct attack, but make use of all opportunities to contribute preventively to crisis management and to the defence of our values and interests in our strategic environment.
An analysis of this environment and of the range of current and foreseeable dangers and risks shows a broadening and deepening of effective security efforts by democratic states and of their cooperation in the framework of international organisations to strengthen peace and stabilise regions of tensions. A reason for concern lies in the persistent readiness to resort to warlike or criminal violence, even in Europe, within states as well as internationally. Moreover, we have to acknowledge the rise of violence, new in terms of magnitude and actors, that can hardly be deterred and that seriously endangers the highly developed Western societies, including Switzerland. Against the background of this manifold threat spectrum, purely national counter-strategies are insufficient, including "niche" strategies of small states.
Therefore, our strategy focuses on initiatives and measures to strengthen our security by participating in promising endeavours of the democratic community of states for crisis management and stabilisation of regions of tension, according to our specific qualities and capabilities. It is worthwhile to invest in making our region more secure even if simple solutions for the problems prevailing at a given time are elusive. By our increased international commitment we improve the conditions for the pursuit of our general interests. At the same time we reduce thereby our vulnerability for blackmail. Moreover, we also exercise thereby the solidarity corresponding both to our tradition and to the expectations of our partners.
A similar approach applies to coping with threats and use of force that make themselves felt primarily within Switzerland. Here, as elsewhere, an international system of countermeasures is essential. It is of equal importance that Switzerland has its own security structure corresponding to the new situation; a structure that enables to prepare, combine and deploy our civilian and military assets in time and line with the nature, intensity and development of threats. This is also a contribution to the legitimate security interests of our neighbours concerning Swiss territory.
Accordingly, Switzerland pursues its objectives of security policy with a strategy of national and international security cooperation. This strategy relies on one hand on the determination and capability to counter dangers and risks to our country and its population, as far as possible and efficient, by our own adequate civilian and military assets integrated in a comprehensive and flexible system. On the other hand, this strategy is aimed at intensifying the security cooperation with friendly states and international organisations where our own assets are insufficient on account of the nature of the threat or geographic or material reason.
* Cooperation at home consists of the assignment of specific missions and corresponding resources to the various areas of security policy at federal, cantonal and communal levels, and of mutually coordinated cooperation in their deployment.
* International cooperation consists of the preferably preventive, but if necessary also reactive involvement beyond our borders. In coordinated multinational cooperation we will contribute to crisis management, the stabilisation of regions of tension and a general mutual reinforcement of security measures
Both elements of cooperation, that between our own instruments of security policy and that with foreign partners, call for efforts to maintain our own instruments up to date. Maintaining the own strength is not in contradiction with international cooperation; on the contrary, it is a prerequisite for effective cooperation and for a confident assertion of our own interests.
This strategy requires a partial shift of previous priorities of our security arrangements, and consequently also of resources, in favour of preventive measures, a geographic extension of our area of security interests, and defence against violence below the threshold of war. The still necessary fall-back positions for an aggravation of dangers, which can never be fully excluded, are ensured by a continuous analysis of the situation and by maintaining important core functions of the armed forces and of civil protection, various planning options and the capability to expand our assets.
5.1.1. Strategic missions
Three strategic missions are necessary of our national security. Compared to the Report 90, there is a change of emphasis given to the individual missions. They are listed here according to their probability of occurrence.
Strengthening of peace and crisis management
By using all its adequate instruments of security policy, Switzerland seizes its opportunities to strengthen peace in its strategic environment and to contribute to the management of international crises, whenever possible by peaceful means, as well as to the reconstruction of war-torn regions.
The strengthening of peace and crisis management take place in a framework set by diplomacy and based on legal treaties and politically binding agreements. However, increasingly other means are also being employed, e.g., personnel and material assets of foreign policy and of the armed forces, civilian police, humanitarian operations, assistance for reconstruction and various kinds of knowledge and material relating to security policy or military technology. For the long-term strengthening of peace and prevention of conflict, the instruments of development assistance geared towards the elimination of the causes of conflict play an important role.
For this strategic mission Switzerland cooperates, as a rule, with other states, groups of states and organisations. It makes good use of global and regional multilateral structures, both as member of such groups or organisations or by ad-hoc cooperation. Switzerland will also launch its own initiatives in this framework. In addition, Switzerland is open for promising bilateral contributions. In these activities, Switzerland exploits its experience with good offices.
The criteria for our commitment include the national interests, the basis in international law, the orientation of activities toward democracy, human rights and humanitarian values, their preventive and sustained effect, the comparative advantages of Switzerland regarding skills and equipment, and the setting of priorities unavoidable in view of the limited resources. Obviously the commitment so defined must correspond to a genuine demand of the international community.
Prevention and Management of Existential Dangers
The instruments of security policy contribute to the prevention and management of existential dangers, particularly in cases of natural and man-made disasters and disturbances of internal order of strategic magnitude.
