Bertha García Gallegos.
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador (PUCE)
| I. The facts. The Military High Command or the colonels? An adamant indigenous movement or leftist union members opposing state modernization? The civilian society joined in unanimous discontent and frustration? A disorganized, intolerant and anthropophagus political class? The use of aborigines and colonels by the military high command? Subterraneous influences of still powerful bankers' and lawyers'? Who were actually responsible for the ousting of the popular democratic government of Ecuadoran |
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On that day, democracy proved to be the weakest creature in this Andean country. Curiously enough, a quick look shows the whole sub-region faces a special crisis. The journal El Comercio de Quito, in its editorial of Thursday February 17, points out that Venezuela is going through the populist experience of an heterodox ruler who led coups d'état and authored emphatic statements against corruption; Colombia strives among such deep and disturbing challenges as guerrilla, drug trafficking and violence. With reference to Peru, the international concern focuses on the official maneuvers to force a third term of office for President Fujimori.
Going back to Ecuador, now floundering about in blunders and hesitation, just eight days before, Mahuad had hastily announced "dollarization" as an extreme measure to prevent the economy from plunging into the hyperinflation precipice. Most certainly, the government inaugurated on August 10, 1998, after an astounding success in its foreign policy with the Peace Agreements signed with Peru in October of the same year, suffered overwhelming failures in the conduct of its policies, based on the non materialized hope of an agreement with the IMF. The government was bent on saving a private financial system immersed in the worst crisis since the 1930s, at the expense of its scanty monetary reserves and the savings of Ecuadorans, seized since March 1999. The indigenous movement, that had silently occupied the city of Quito a week before the events with the express intent to overthrow "all three branches" (a threat that not even themselves ever thought would materialize), was the background for the true and the sham in the political events attending our country's entrance to the 21st century. Maybe this aborigines' movement was the voice that most appropriately represented the irritation of a whole society that over the past few years was affected to such extent that almost 60% of its population fell into a state of poverty, saw minimum wages shrink from US$ 150 to 35, was hit by the populism of Bucarám, the political opportunism of Alarcón's interim office, the corruption and ineffectiveness of politicians and bureaucrats, and the speculation of private bankers.
As the situation worsened, the arguments supporting democracy lost momentum and paved the way for the "coup d´état" social justification. Surprisingly for some and as expected by others, a large part of public opinion endorsed the uprising and accompanied the rapidly changing events that started at 10:00 am with the occupation of the National Congress by indigenous people, an occupation that was facilitated by the same military men who were guarding the building. Citizens saw in astonishment how a group of colonels from the ground force, many of who are members of the "new military intellectuals", and heard their harangues until the takeover of the government house by the insurrects at dawn. Short time before, the Senior military Command had let the President know that it was withdrawing its support to the government and was not responsible for his personal security in the face of the approaching demonstrators. The sudden declaration of a military force considered victorious in the Alto Cenepa campaign in January and February 1995, revealing its inability to protect the presidential house was in fact pathetic.
On that January 21, 2000, the magic of television allowed the Ecuadorans to follow the steps of the uprising minute after minute. Power was passed from one to the other: starting with the overthrown president who refused to resign, to a "Revolutionary Junta" composed of Amazonia indigenous leader Antonio Vargas, who is president of the powerful CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador), Carlos Solórzano Constantine, former Supreme Court Chief Justice and a symbol of political opportunism, and Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez (most senior officer in his class). After long deliberations with the Senior Command Staff who arrived at the Government Palace before the insurrects did, power was frozen for about three hours in the hands of the "National Salvation Junta" formed by the former two and the Chief of the Joint Command, Gen. Carlos Mendoza, formerly chief of the ground force and at the time also Minister in charge of the Defense, a job he had got through artful means in a conspiracy based on the naiveté of the President who, a week before, had allowed the removal of his Minister of Defense, General José Gallardo, an austere man, much respected by several generations of military. After tough negotiations in the house of government, near midnight, Gutiérrez gave way to "his" general and confessed to the press: "I have to obey the hierarchy. My general Mendoza has committed to assume power" (Diario Hoy, Blanco y Negro, February 5).
Ecuadorans, even those who have given legitimacy to the coup, were terrified at being left at the mercy of these parvenu governing party that later stated that "they had not intended" to take power but just to defenestrate the hesitating ruler.
At the dawn of January 22, however, power was already in the hands of a constitutional successor: Vice President Gustavo Novoa Bejarano took office at, of all places, the Ministry of National Defense. He proclaimed the conspicuous Mendoza a "hero" for supposedly designing, together with the High Commanders, such brilliant strategy to drive out the indigenous people and the seditious colonels.
The political weakness of the fledging government showed, inter alia, in the scarce options it had to purge the military high command that had put it in office. In order to recover the presidential authority, Noboa used his sober character, an ethical discourse and highly demanding measures against corruption, persuasion to the National Congress (where he has not an allied majority) to urge the approval of acts that will govern the dollarization process and, finally, the effort to build a mediation space to put the power of the army (representing approximately two thirds of the military), under control by looking to the other forces -the navy and the air force-that evidently did not participate in the events. The attempt materialized in the appointment of Admiral Hugo Unda as Minister of Defense and an, as yet, much too soft message to the rest of the forces to remind them of their constitutional duties.
As regards the military, their attack "stroke as lightning in a still sky", to put it in the words of Marx in his bright introduction to Luis Bonaparte's 18th Brumaire. The events disclosed that the image of one of the most democratic armed forces in Latin America with a most harmonious relationship with the civilians hid, behind their "strategic obedience" to the civil power -cronically weak and restless-a deftly assembled mechanism for the successive military staffs to keep the civilian government under pressure. The strategy consisted in watching the evolution of events with a neutral approach, visiting the magistrates to present possible crisis outcome scenarios, minutely designed in military institutes; indirectly or directly condition their protection to certain political or economic changes; withdrawing their support at a key moment in order to either force drastic decisions or pave the way for uprising, as the case may be. At least three recent episodes confirm this sui generis maneuvering over the past few years: the destitution of Vice President Dahik under charges of corruption, in 1996; the removal of military support to Bucarám; and Mahuad's fall. Just this time the President's refusal to surrender his office, uncovered the involvement of at least part of the senior staff in the different alternatives contemplated to consummate the coup d'état.
There is a difference between the coups d'état of the '60s and '70s and the "strategic pressures" on civilian governments in the '90s. Those were mostly moves of military high officers with civilian political associates that remained "in the shadows" while the rest of the civilian society was just a silent audience of these colorful events. Now they seem to appear as an "answer" to popular clamor exhibited in dense demonstrations and in a scenario where the president is confined to total political isolation. Bucarám was ousted amid a street protest of over two million people. Indigenous pressure played a key role in the case of Mahuad.
But on this occasion, the matter escaped the control of the senior staff, went down to the middle and lower rank officers of the army, and burst through the pressure of discontent and frustrations nurtured for a long time that eventually fractured the chain of command in all directions: sixteen elite colonels, at least four strategists among them, quite close to the senior staff; 195 officers studying at the Higher Polytechnic School of the Army (ESPE), the Army War College and the Higher School of the Army; 150 "Cenepa heroes" now rendering administrative services but still commanding great respect in the military rank and file (El Comercio, February 23); about 300 officers "contaminated" by hierarchical compromise and loyalties, or "misguided" by the tide of the events. From the military point of view, the insurrection -had it prospered-would have, by one strike, cut short the careers of at least two generations of senior colonels and generals.
The organic node, if there was any, was Colonel Lucio Gutierrez who, for the past few months, enjoyed a strong leadership among the military by voicing their claims against wage and salary freezing, the shrinking of the military budget, especially reflected in the conscription system and the oblivion to which maimed Cenepa heroes had been confined to and whose indebtedness rose after the dollarization. The meeting of the colonel and his followers with the Conaje, the most active group of which are currently the indigenous organizations from Sierra, occurred, coincidentally, when the indigenous people were looking for support to their mobilization. This union gave a political basis to add to military claims, by fighting corruption, denouncing dramatic levels of poverty among the people, particular the indigenous population, all attributed to the government's policies. The rest came as a result of the spontaneous adherence of military intellectuals to a social mobilization that never ceased to increase and gradually incorporated other union and political forces that took advantage of the opportunity: part of the golden bureaucracy of oil and telecommunications state worker unions (also accused of corruption) and even the leftmost political parties represented by the Marxist-Leninist MDP (Popular Democratic Movement).
The military uprising was then consummated as a result of the complex convergence of elements of various intensities and gravity: evident signs of manipulation of the military senior staff by government officials, institutional interests, traditional military behavior in Ecuador, other elements pointing to deep erosion in military leadership and internal structure that should be analyzed much more thoroughly. The revolt could be suffocated thanks to a number of factors (certainly foreign or military): pressures of the US Department of State; availability of other alternatives designed by the senior staff (take charge of the government or follow the constitutional succession line); non involvement of the other armed forces -the navy and the air force; support to the senior staff's alternatives by the military Units that hold direct control of arms in the rest of the country, particularly regarding the power within the ground force: the Galápagos (Sierra Central) and Patria (in the capital city) Brigades and Special Forces.
II. Matters to be discussed
The grave fracture within the Ecuadoran armed forces occurs at a time of extreme vulnerability of the country, both at the domestic and foreign levels: On the external front there always exist the danger of a expansion of the Colombian conflict across the extended and open border with that country. In the domestic field, apart from a worrying incipient terrorist outbreak, a new social uprising cannot be ruled out, particularly if the economic measures taken by the government do not have an immediate effect for the benefit of an anxious population.
The analysis has to be framed within two assumptions: a) the Ecuadoran situation could well extend to other countries facing the globalization of their economies without having solved the root causes of extreme conditions of economic and social inequality suffered by their populations and without having adapted to such process their political, juridical, economic and even military institutions. Extreme poverty and social exclusion will turn into powerful and decisive nuclei of political instability and the rationale for new radicalized nationalisms; b) it should never be forgotten that civil-military relations are relations of force. In this sense, any analysis of the armed forces' behavior will have to take civilian responsibilities into account.
In view of the above, a central question is in point --which leaves no room for any associated doubt: Are the armed forces organizing services committed to support democracies or there are specific scenarios in which they could become a threat against democracy? To give an answer to this question many elements of different scopes should be considered and we intend to have them as the subject of our DISCUSSION. Provisionally, at least for the Ecuadoran case, we could mention the following ones:
- The loss of significant references in military life, without any replacement process having been designed, implemented or completed because of the short time elapsed. This not only happens regarding the "vacuum" left by the end of the cold war but also as a result of the processes in each country. Although not completely explicitly, the end of the conflict with Peru eliminated the bases of the expectations and symbols around which military discipline was maintained during all of Ecuador's democratic life and civilian society and military institutions maintained a close relationship. The more so, in as much as the solution was not fully satisfying for a large proportion of the population and hence of the military. The strategic front represented by the unstable north border with Colombia, while urging and relevant has not yet attained its deserved place in the minds of civilians or the military. The events of January 21st could be the expression of a "mission crisis syndrome" that has affected other Latin American armies, or a sort of "defense strategy" of the armed forces. It shouldn't come as a surprise that the army, which was the force that borne the most weight of the war against Peru, is the one most affected by this crisis.
- The relation between institutional/ group-related interests and military discipline. The effect of the budgetary cuts introduced by the Mahuad administration to face the economic crisis took its toll on military salaries, affected advanced plans of war equipment procurement and reduced conscription programs to 20%. Ten thousand men were assigned to fight against crime. All of this happened without the government having clearly designed a new military and defense policy according to the new strategic situation of the country. Discontent eroded military discipline. The contrast between the austerity measures implemented among the military and the lenient and hesitating attitude towards those responsible for financial corruption is a frequent subject of discussion among military officers of all ranks.
- The Ecuadoran experience has proved that democracy cannot exercise the due civilian control of the armed forces through a weak political system, inept for an effective leadership. Once and again in this century the political class has been unable to organize an extremely heterogeneous community whether in geographic, social and ethnical terms, around duly legitimated proposals. This has had an impact on the ability of institutions to bring about general well being. A pronounced fragmentation of interests has led to political instability and resorting to the military as a mediating and arbitration instance not only in circumstances of political conflict between elites, but also concerning popular and union interests against the political sector and the government. There is an excessive, more or less explicit delegation of the state and the political class onto the military of wide areas of social responsibility (education, health, community development, forestation, environment protection) but there is also a real usurpation of those fields by the military, through autonomous policies stemming from institutional action aimed at subrogating for civilian institutions' lack of control and effectiveness. The military have turned into the sole references of state action over extended geographic, political and socially peripheral areas. This has favored a systematic discourse critical of political institutions among the military.
- In contrast with the significant interest that civilians take in military matters and despite some projects not fully completed, there is not yet enough knowledge among civilians of military matters and problems. Specifically, an explicit concern for the implementation of adequate mechanisms for civil control. None of the executive or the legislative branches, political parties, civic organizations or local governments have a definite position in this respect.
- These events might be signaling the limitations of a multi-function model for the armed forces as the Ecuadoran is. The "military model" for development may be only ideally the one needed in a country with so deep social inequality and an administration not efficient enough to meet basic needs. But, as many analysts have confirmed, the employment of the armed forces for tasks other than those directly related to defense is creating an array of new interests and contradictions of a business, social and political nature, professional competition, fight for the management of resources, privileged access to power, challenges to authority that impair the possibility to build a democratic civil-military balance. The armed forces, in spite of their hierarchical structure, are not monolithic entities. All these interests are bound to produce fractures, personal aspirations and even leaderships alien to military logic.
- There also exists a doctrine-related issue that may be the most significant side of the problem. In this sense, doctrine may be lagging behind the times, still handling the theoretical framework of the cold war or trying to re-instate its premises through ad-hoc formulations. The concept of Security is perceived with extreme vagueness and latitude. This is not so much a prerogative and within the competence of the state as it is of the armed forces. Maybe there is a confusion between defense (a task the armed forces are supposed to engage in by explicit delegation of the state) and defense. When security comprises everything: health, education, road infrastructure, forest conservation, indigenous and underprivileged people well being, political stability; and when security falls under the competence of the armed forces, the necessary outcome is military preeminence. Over the past few years, the military have fostered their vision that development is dependent on security instead of security being a result of development. This has led to an expansion of their mission in politics since, from that perspective, governance also depends on this view of security. The notion of domestic security, as actions intended for the development of the indigenous, black and excluded urban population in order to prevent subversion, undertaken without the pertinent civilian control mechanisms, is possibly leading the armed forces to take political positions and enhancing their image as the "protectors" of society.
- Military education institutions are seeding with proposals and analyses about the country's development and governance, but there are no sufficient ways or mechanisms to allow for their expression in the press and other media, universities and other academic instances in the country where debate is frequent. In an ambivalent attitude, the political system formally discourages military expression of their political concerns while, in practice, particularly in critical situations, demand such pronouncements from them. Officers, specifically those from the military institutes, act as "consultants" or "political advisors" within circles very much close to the government through military senior staff. These relations are not exempt of mutual manipulation. The exercise focuses on the presentation of "political feasibility models" within potential crisis scenarios. In Ecuador, for example, the application of a systemic model combining all factors and the points where the most tension would gather, allowed the military (in the concrete Bucarám and Mahuad crises) to set the dividing line in the "legal" vs. "legitimate" relation, where the variables determining the latter are by no means free from subjective connotations. In any case, the results lead to the conclusion that, at least in the cases in question, the government's legitimacy was "technically" missing. And thence, would this "technical" conclusion (anti-democratic by all standards) qualify the armed forces for political intervention? This appreciation of "legitimacy" ends up being a sign of authoritarianism.
Of course, the problem under analysis may have other connotations, not always logical and rational. There are many other sides from which the question could be approached: Is general military education efficient? Is the political information imparted in military institutes adequate? Should civil control mechanisms be only institutional or should they be referred to a democratic political culture? Are the personnel selection processes in the armed forces adequate? Are the internal communication systems at all levels and hierarchies within the forces democratic enough? Are internal communication channels failing? Are the communication systems between armed forces and civilian society as efficient as they should be?
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