INTRODUCTION

1.1 Prefatory Statement

The past decade had been a critical period for civil-military relations and, particularly, civil control in the Philippines. For the first time in the country's history, the relationship between the civilian political leadership and the military was tested to the limits. Specifically, a reformist sector of the military triggered a "people revolution" in February 1986 that led to the fall of Marcos and the subsequent installation of Aquino as President. Soon afterwards, a series of abortive coups took place. The latest and most serious coup attempt of December 1989 could have succeeded if not for the intervention of a foreign power.

The period, thus, marked the rise of the military as a dominant force in national politics, particularly its crucial role in the country's democratic transition from authoritarian rule. It was observed that 30 former authoritarian countries have become democracies since 1974 that doubled the number of democratic states. Huntington refers to the recent victory of democracy as forming the "Third Wave" of democratization, with the two previous waves occurring from 1828 to 1926 and from 1943 to 1962. He notes two significant observations: (a) that democratization is a "Matter of two steps forward or two steps backward"; and (b) that history "does not sail ahead in a straight line, but when skilled and determined leaders are at the helm, it does move forward."

The return of the Philippines to democratic rule in 1986 had been unique because of the key roles and close collaboration of the civilian and the military. But the process of democratic transition and consolidation suffered a setback because of a series of coup attempts.

What went wrong during the democratic transition under the Aquino administration? Why is it that some military factions are involved in coups? What is the future of civil-military relations in the Philippines? As posed by Huntington, "Could this democratic breakthrough only be a stage in a cycle that leads back to authoritarianism?"

Effective responses to these questions would require an understanding of the military and their role in society, most particularly their relationship vis-a-vis the political authorities.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This is a study of current civil-military relations in the Philippines. Specifically, it focuses on the perceptions of an influential sector of the Philippine military: the active-duty Philippine Military Academy-trained officers. The study intends to provide answers to the following basic questions:

1. How do they perceive the current state of civil-military relations and civil control? How do they perceive their involvement in politics?

2. What are their perceptions of the government's policies and performance that relate directly or indirectly with the military's mission of contributing to national security?

3. What are the implications of their perceptions of civilian control and broader civil-military relations?

4. What policy measures might be considered to enhance civil-military relations? How can civil control be enhanced ideally with voluntary military support?

1.3 Significance of the Study

The need to monitor the military perceptions is vital to our policymakers. It provides them with a relevant feedback mechanism on how the military relate to policies that directly or indirectly affect them. With such information, the necessary policies may be formulated and implemented to address legitimate military

grievances and demands; thus, averting direct military interventions in politics.

This study may be considered a departure from previous studies on the military in that it focuses on the perceptions of military officers themselves. In stressing the importance of focusing on military perceptions, Lissak views that "the propensity to intervene is dependent upon the officer corps's interpretation of developments outside the military establishment."

Also, this study is a continuation of past researches on the military that the writer had the opportunity to be involved with. But unlike these researches that made use of non-random sampling, this study employs a representative random sampling. Thus, it could be the first survey of the military using this method with active-duty PMA officers as respondents.

1.4 Scope of the Study

This is a study of civil-military relations and civil-control. However, it focuses on the interrelationship of three main variables: regime legitimacy, military disposition and opportunity to intervene, and military intervention.

This study uses data generated through a survey of 500 officers selected by random sampling from a population of 3000 active-duty PMA-trained officers.

The survey focused on PMA officers for the following reasons:

1. An ideal survey of the military would consider all AFP personnel involving 152,000 officers and enlisted men. Another approach would be to consider the officer corps consisting of 14,000 officers. Either alternative poses formidable problems of manageability as well as adequacy of resources available to researchers.

2. The choice of active-duty PMA-trained officers may be further justified as they constitute the core of the regular officer corps of the AFP. They also occupy major command and staff positions particularly at the higher levels of the AFP. For these reasons, these officers may be said to influence to a large degree the perceptions of the AFP as a whole.

3. Actual military interventions against the Marcos and Aquino regimes were led by PMA graduates. As discussed in section 2.2 of this study, a major reason for this is their generally middle class socioeconomic and superior educational backgrounds which tend to make them politically aware and sensitive.

1.5 Survey of Related Literature

As a background to the analytical framework of this paper, the literature on civil-military relations is presented. Initially, the study discusses the theory and approaches of civil-military relations and civil control. This is followed by a presentation of specific studies on the subject here and abroad.

1.51 Civil-Military Relations:

Theory and Approaches

In a comprehensive review of the concepts of civil-military relations, Lovell identifies three approaches: the traditional or formal-legalistic, modern, and issue area approach.

Influenced by the post-World War II approach to politics which focused on formal institutions and legal authority, the traditional or formal-legalistic approach on civil-military relations deal with the threat posed by the military to civil government. Thus, the solution mainly rests on civil control of the military through constitutional checks and balances. In line with the behavioral movement, Lovell criticizes this approach in that it ignores important informal sources of interactions and power. He notes Dahl observation that "formal constitutional prescriptions may become undermined or obsolete in practice and - perhaps, more importantly - ignores informal and internalized constraints that often in politics are more important than formalized constraints." Lovell identifies other critics of this approach that include Huntington, Millis, Laswell, Vagts, and Lyons.

Although considered as an analytical improvement of the formal-legalistic approach, the modern approach has its shortcomings. These limitations include: a parochial American focus, perpetuation of the view that the "civil" and "military" view as sharply differentiated, and an a priori approach that neglect important empirical data. Lovell then suggests an alternative framework, an issue area approach, that is more comparative and dynamic and one that can accommodate both empirical and normative analysis. Specifically, this approach is relevant for political systems that have complex structures and values, blurred civil-military boundaries, and interventionist military.

involvement

Civil control means that "basic decisions relating to military forces must be made by politically accountable officials." This means that in a democracy, all basic policy which includes military policy must be made by officials elected by and responsible to the people with whom sovereignty rests.

Civil control, thus, refers to the subordination of the military to civilian authority. In operational terms, civilian control means the ability of the civilian political authority to limit the military to function within bounds laid down by the Constitution and the laws. An indicator of civilian control is where civilian political leaders effectively make policy decisions and authoritatively determine the areas of military competence, with the military accepting such decisions.

Civil control may be better understood as it relates to the military involvement in politics. Should the military be viewed as apolitical or very much involved in politics? This question has been debated on since the late 1950s when the relevant professional literature biased itself initially in favor of an apolitical or even anti-political military. Since the early 1970s, however, the focus of the literature has changed toward viewing the military as a naturally politically involved and crucial institution.

Welch, in fact, asserts that all armed forces are involved in politics, with the nature of their involvement being "a question not of whether, but of how much and of what kind." The specific nature of the military's involvement depends largely on the perceived legitimacy of the civilian government.

Schematically, Welch presents a continuum of the military involvement in politics:

Military Military Military Military

Influence -- Participation -- Control -- Control

(civil (with (without

control) partners) partners)

As adopted in most Western, democratic states and in some developing countries, military influence is considered the "normal" form of civil control. Although the military is not excluded from politics, its involvement is limited. Specifically, only senior ranking officers are involved in politics. Also, civilian and political roles are clearly delineated with officers keeping away from the latter. At the same time, political influence is exercised through conventional channels. Thus, direct contacts are allowed only between civilian political and military leaders at the top positions of the military hierarchy.

Another stage or condition of civil control according to the Welch schematic is one where there is military participation beyond simple military influence. Here, the military is directly or indirectly involved in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions. This usually happens in regimes that are not so stable. In this regard, civilian political leaders try to coopt the military leaders to provide a semblance of stability and support. Under military control, civilian control disappears, with the armed forces deciding the basic issues. Military control may either be done with or without partnerships with civilian leaders.

The literature on civil-military relations views two methods of strengthening civil control: external control by means of legitimate, effective, and widely-supported political institutions; and internal control provided through military professionalism.

External civilian control over the military in a liberal democratic setting usually consists of legal prescriptions as well as political and administrative arrangements. Specifically, control takes the forms of: "vesting of command responsibilities in the civilian head of state who becomes the commander-in-chief of the armed forces; powers vested in the legislature such as investigative power and power to declare war and states of emergency; and general budgetary supervision."

Internal civilian control provided by military professionalism is a subject of contrasting viewpoints between two noted scholars. Huntington proposed an apolitical and neutral military profession that is relatively isolated from society. On the other hand, Janowitz suggested a politically sensitive military profession that is integrated with the society.

As for the literature on civilian-military relations in Southeast Asia, there have been two recent compilations of country studies on this subject.

One is Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia. It focuses on the military role in politics as well as on the broad aspects of civilian-military relations of Southeast Asian states. Although published in 1984 and, thus, do not include recent political development particularly in the Philippines, it presents, however, some interesting findings. Based on endogenous and exogenous factors of military intervention, it classifies two types of states in Southeast Asia: those states where the military plays an active role in politics or has carried out a coup (Burma, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Laos) and those where the military has not directly involved itself in politics (Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines). Two explanations are presented for the disparity of these two types of states. An important factor for later civil-military relations is the nature of the struggle for independence. Where the nationalist struggle was more peaceful and gradual, civil supremacy predominated as in Singapore and Malaysia. But in countries where the nationalist struggle was relatively more violent, the military's role has been dominant and substantive as in Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma and Laos.

Another factor is that "the politicization of the officer corps is a function upon the strength and cohesion of the civilian elites."

Where the civilian elites are strong and cohesive as in Singapore and Malaysia, the role of the military is limited or circumscribed. But where the civilian elites are weak and divided as in Burma, Thailand and Indonesia, the military plays a pre-eminent role.

The other book is Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, which examines the role of the military in the political stability and development in Southeast Asian states.

The case study on the Philippine military was written by Miranda and this writer. It is based on a survey of military officers who were undergoing schooling in the DND and AFP training institutions. Conducted a few months before the major coup attempt of August 1987, the survey revealed the following military sentiments:

(a) They are involved in protecting a government whose leaders do not appear to trust them enough, nor to provide them with enough resources to wage a successful campaign against intractable subversives and who even appear to be indifferent to the urgent needs of military men while favoring rebels with conciliatory policies.

(b) They must court the support of the citizenry, enough of whom might be appreciative of the military, through campaigns that military men traditionally have not been well trained for, using military resources which other civilian agencies could have contributed to building up or whose depletion the same agencies could have minimized by not making the military the lead agency in counterinsurgency.

(c) They encounter hostility from both local and national government officials who facilitate the build-up of insurgent forces in the country.

(d) They are unable to exert enough influence on policy-making especially in the area of counterinsurgency and other security areas.

(e) They are being made to fight a war with too many fronts, with too few resources, too many constraints, with not enough decisive leadership and, until lately,lacking moral support from many government officials whom the military is tasked to protect.

(f) Finally, unable to trust most civilian agencies and civilian officials and beset with quite a bit of demoralization within the military, they must maintain their confidence in their military superiors, most of the latter being equally capable as civilian officials even in the management of civilian offices.

The academic literature on the Philippine military has grown in recent years. An earlier study on the military field was done by Hernandez who dwelt on the extent of civilian control of the military from 1946 to 1976. In this study Hernandez viewed the role of the military as having expanded from influence to participation particularly when martial law was declared in 1972. She also identified the various critical environmental and institutional factors affecting civilian-military relations in the country. These factors involve civil-military environmental variables, intrinsically military variables, and military corporate interests. Miranda in recent articles on the Philippine military, however, traced its politicization to the "general trend toward mass politicization in Third-World countries and the involvement of their military establishments in national political management after the end of World War II." Using an ongoing study that generated a demographic data base of 7000 PMA cadets from classes 1951 to 1990, he is inclined to believe that military politicization started even before Marcos declared martial law in 1972. This is shown by a trend in recruitment of cadets who come from generally middle-class families. These cadets are mostly with college backgrounds and they come from the best universities and colleges in the country.

Civil control is a provision enshrined in the Philippine Constitution. It states that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military." One of the framers of the Constitution, Bernas clarifies that the provision does not speak of civilian supremacy but of civilian authority. He cites two elements that are needed for civilian supremacy to survive: (a) a civilian government that is both legitimate and credible; and (b) an armed force of the highest ethical professionalism. He emphasized that without one or the other, civilian supremacy cannot survive. Without legitimacy or credibility of the civilian government, the military will rise as "protector of the people and the State." Without a professional armed forces, the military will only be the oppressor and not a protector or preserver of peace.

Besides the survey conducted by Miranda and this writer in April-May 1987, there have been other surveys on the military in recent years. This include the Laurel survey after the August 28, 1987 coup attempt and this writer's masteral thesis study at NDCP in May in 1988.

A survey conducted by Vice-President Salvador Laurel among military personnel, immediately after the August 1987 coup attempt, confirmed the findings of the Miranda-Ciron survey of military demoralization. Some reasons for their disenchantment include perceptions that: the government had not shown much concern for the soldiers, the Presidential Commission on Human Rights had pro-communist bias which hindered the counterinsurgency operations, the release of top communist leaders only benefited the insurgents, the government had displayed a double standard of justice by being soft on communist rebels while being hard on the mutineers, some local Officers-in-Charge (OICs) were not assisting the military in this fight against the communist rebels, and some foreign missionaries and religious organizations were overtly supporting the CPP/NPA.

A follow-up study was conducted by this writer in May 1988 for his masteral study at NDCP on a broader subject involving national problems and issues. The findings of this study showed that the respondents reacted positively to government policies after the August 28, 1987 coup attempt. Although appreciating the increase in their salaries and benefits, the military continued to be concerned with counterinsurgency problems as well as with general and more comprehensive political and economic issues. It was also found out that the respondents were a more homogenous entity than was indicated by past and current treatments that the military is severely divided or factionalized.

1.6 Hypothesis

As a general rule, based on the findings in the literature of civilian-military relations, the military tend to inhibit themselves from intervening in politics.

It is hypothesized, however, that when a government loses its legitimacy, the disposition and opportunity of the military to intervene in politics tend to increase which may result in military intervention.

1.7 Analytical Framework and

Methodology

The analytical framework initially identifies the principal variables used and how they relate to each other. This is followed by a presentation of the specific indicators and measures as well as the methods and procedures used in the study.

1.71 Overview

To be able to explain adequately the dynamics of current civil-military relations in the Philippines, this study uses as an analytical framework two basic concepts: legitimacy and military intervention.

Specifically, this study adopts primarily the: (a) concept of legitimacy by Friedrich, which was also adopted by Agpalo in his analysis of the Aquino administration; and (b) concept of military intervention by Finer.

Conceptually, this study links three major variables: the low legitimacy of the civilian regime as the independent variable, military intervention as the dependent variable, and the disposition and opportunity to intervene as intervening variables. The relationship of these variables to each other is presented in figure 1.1. Thus, it is posited that low regime legitimacy provides the military the disposition and opportunity to intervene resulting, finally, in military intervention.

According to Finer, the disposition and/or opportunity to intervene may lead to varying types of overt military intervention such as blackmail and displacement or supplantment of the civilian regime. In this regard, Finer focuses on disposition and opportunity to intervene as the primary independent variables that cause military intervention, the dependent variable.

This study, on the other hand, highlights on the effects of low legitimacy (the independent variable) to both the military disposition and opportunity to intervene (the intervening variables). The latter which may or may not lead to overt military intervention (dependent variable).

It is the objective of this study, therefore, to attempt an empirical test, through a perception survey of an influential group of military officers. This is based on the thesis that low regime legitimacy provides the military the disposition and opportunity to intervene in politics that may, ultimately, lead to overt military intervention.

To achieve the purpose of this study, operational indicators and measures will be made on the major concepts used which is the subject of the succeeding sections.

1.72 Conceptual Definition

and Indicators

The argument that the failure of civilian regimes provides the motive and opportunity for military intervention has been espoused by noted writers on civil-military relations. Along with Finer, these writers include Nordlinger and Crouch. A lucid explanation for this thesis is presented by Crouch:

It is often argued that military intervention in politics only takes place when civilian governments prove unable to govern effectively. Rarely, if ever, does the army take over simply to fulfil its own ambitions. Even when the military is already politically oriented and its officers politically ambitious, military intervention normally follows the failure of civilian governments to preserve political stability and achieve satisfactory growth. This failure leads to a loss of legitimacy which makes them susceptible to violent change. The failure of civilian regimes thus provides not only a motive for intervention but also the opportunity. Conversely, a strong, effective civilian government which successfully

maintains its legitimacy seems virtually immune to the possibility of a military coup.

Legitimacy may be generally defined as:

a condition of positive valuation, validity, and acceptance enjoyed by individual rulers, political institutions and movements, and by systems of authority, by reason of the accordance of such rulers, institutions, movements, and systems of authority with some law, principle, or source of authorization.

In political science, legitimacy has a second level or a more specific range of meanings. It designates an important action of a sovereign and this is "the condition of being in accordance with law or principle requiring acceptance of the claims of sovereign power." In the words of Friedrich, legitimacy is "a very particular kind of consensus which concerns the question of the right or title to rule or to govern." It is this consensus that grants the political leadership with authority, respect and acceptance. Lipset further describes legitimacy as:

the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper... the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.

In his analysis of the legitimacy of the Aquino government, Agpalo classifies two types of legitimacy: civil and performance. Civil legitimacy is based on the consent of the people as advocated by Locke and Rousseau. As the principle of modern constitutional and representative government, civil legitimacy was adopted by the Philippines in the 1935, 1973, and 1987 constitutions. Performance legitimacy is based on the ability of the government to govern. In defining performance legitimacy, Agpalo draws inspiration from Friedrich who cites that one way to achieve legitimacy is through "performance or success legitimacy," particularly through "success in war, and the maintenance of prosperity, order, peace." This paper adopts the above concept of legitimacy. Civil legitimacy, operationalized as consent of the people, has election and plebiscite as main indicators. Performance legitimacy, which means the ability of the civilian government to govern, is determined primarily through opinion or perception survey of government performance.

This study, therefore, makes use of the perception survey to find out the civil and performance legitimacy of the Aquino administration. The indicators of civil legitimacy will be determined primarily through: (a) the perceptions of the respondents on the trustworthiness of government personalities and institutions; and (b) the results of respondents' participation in elections and referenda. On the other hand, performance legitimacy will be indicated by: (a) the respondents' perceptions of the performance of principal government personalities and institutions; and (b) their performance of certain national problems and issues.

This study primarily adopts the framework of Finer on military intervention, which is defined as "the armed forces' substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities."

Military intervention is considered a product of two sets of forces: the disposition and opportunity to intervene (the intervening variables in this study).

The military disposition to intervene will have three indicators: the motive, mood, and self-divisions of the military. The motive will be categorized and measured in terms of the military perceptions of national, corporate and individual self-interests. The mood will be measured in terms of their grievances vis-a-vis the civilian regime. Self-divisions will be tested by their homogeneity and heterogeneity of the respondents.

The opportunity or occasion to intervene is primarily dictated by conditions in the society.

In justifying its dominant role in military intervention and in response to a reviewer's comment of the earlier edition of his book that it was a "most un-military book", Finer quotes Huntington:

The most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military, but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of the society .... The causes which produce military intervention in politics ... lie not in the nature of the group but in the structure of society. In particular, they lie in the absence or weakness of effective political institutions in the society.... [There is an] absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group action ... social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions; no corps of professional leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediary to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts.

The opportunity to intervene will be indicated by the subjective views of the respondents on the probable occasion for military intervention. Also, the objective conditions of the society based on economic, social, and political indicators during the period of study will also be availed of.

In sum, this study attempts to test Finer's propositions of these subjective and objective factors of military intervention based on four possible situations:

1.73 Design and Procedures

The design may be considered as exploratory. It is an effort to attempt probably the first randomized or representative survey of an influential group of Philippine military officers.

This study involved the systematic collection of perception data reflecting on the military view of civil-military relations. The gathering of the data is done through a self-administered survey questionnaire.

The survey population consists of the active-duty Philippine Military Academy-trained officers of about 3,000 officers consisting of 23 classes graduated from 1958 to 1990.

The complete list of PMA officers in the active service was generated based on the files of the PMA Alumni Association, the AFP Computer Center, and the offices of the deputy staff for personnel of the four branches of service (PA, PC, PAF and PN).

A sample of 500 active officers or 16.7% of the concerned population was taken as respondents based on attributes of the branch of service and rank (see chart 1.2 and table 3.1).

The sampling procedure took several steps. First, the PMA officers were categorized by branch of service and rank. Second, the sample number for each category was determined based on its proportional representation with the AFP regular officer corps. And finally, based on the number of sample for each category, the list for the sample respondents was taken randomly through the table of random numbers.

Categorized by rank variable, the sample respondents are proportionally represented by the: general rank (92%), colonel (10%), lieutenant colonel (7%), major (7%), captain (27%), first lieutenant (27%), and second lieutenant (19%).

On the other hand, sample respondents by branch of service have these proportions: Philippine Army (40%), Philippine Constabulary (30%), Philippine Air Force (13%), and Philippine Navy (18%).

The questionnaires were then provided the sample respondents. The survey period was scheduled for five months from September 1, 1990 to January 30, 1991.

The question items of the survey questionnaires generally cover the various aspects of civil-military relations and particularly focusing on regime legitimacy and military intervention. Some question items were taken from the previous survey studies on the military. The purpose is to be able to compare the results of these surveys and draw meaningful inferences on them. Similarly, a few items were adopted from the latest survey questions of the Social Weather Station to be able to compare the PMA officers' responses with the national population and, particularly, with Metro Manila residents.

The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part asked the respondent on some personal-history data while the second part asked about his opinion, feeling and belief on the various aspects of civil-military relations. The questionnaire was primarily close-ended. To ascertain the intensity of the respondent's conviction or feeling, the questionnaire was asked to check from four- to six-graded scale including neutral and "don't know" responses.

The second part of the questionnaire comprised eleven sections touching on the following topics: (1) importance of national security and development issues; (2) trustworthiness: institutions; (3) trustworthiness: personalities; (4) performance: institutions; (5) performance: personalities; (6) perceptions on selected national issues; (7) major grievances against the Aquino admistration; (8) major grievances as a basis for coup against the Aquino administration; (9) threats to national security and stability; (10) performance of government on selected issues; and (11) perception of their children joining the military.

The questionnaire was pretested on 28 active-duty PMA-trained officers of various ranks and branches of service. Based on the results of the pretest, the questionnaire was slightly revised and corrections were made particularly on its length as well as the phrasing and sequence of questions.

The questionnaire is distributed through arial and mail to the 500 randomly-identified officers (from a list of about 3000 PMA-trained officers) who are generally dispersed in office and field assignments all over the country. In this regard, the Metro Manila liaison offices of the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary afford convenient arial services to respondents field assignments particularly those with the seven army divisions and the twelve constabulary regional commands.

The processing of the survey data was handled by the Data Processing Section of the School of Economics, University of the Philippines.

This study will primarily use frequency and frequency distributions analyses. A rationale for this method is expressed by Kerlinger:

[Frequency] Distributions, like graphs have probably been little used in the behavioral sciences and education. The study of relations and testing of hypotheses are almost automatically associated with correlations and comparison of averages. The use of distributions is considered less often. Some research problems, however, can be solved better by using distribution analysis.

The large number of question items in this study makes frequency and frequency distributions analyses a more suitable method to use. A frequency mean index is constructed. The index measure will be scored in that 100% will be the highest score representing a most favorable attitude and 0% as the lowest score representing the least favorable attitude. Also, the index measure will be divided into five equal parts. The highest fifth representing a most favorable attitude will also be considered as a positive norm. On the other hand, the lowest fifth representing the least favorable attitude will be considered a negative norm.

To determine further the intensity and direction of the perception of the respondents towards certain issues, the margin rating is taken. It is arrived at by taking the difference between the favorable attitude and the unfavorable attitude scores. For example the margin of trust rating is the difference between very much/much trust and little/very little trust.

Other statistical tools, primarily chi-square and gamma, are used particularly in determining the correlation of key variables. Through these statistical measures and tests, the significance, strength and direction of the relationship of the main variables are determined. Also, chi-square is used for the homogeneity tests among rank, service and ethnicity groups.

Analysis, in this study, is defined and interpreted as:

The categorizing, ordering, manipulating, and summarizing of data to obtain answers to research questions. The purpose of analysis is to reduce data to intelligible and

interpretable form so that the relations of research problem can be studied and tested. A primary purpose of statistics, for example, is to manipulate and summarize numerical data and to compare the obtained results with chance expectations.

Interpretation, as a result of analysis, makes inferences and draws conclusion about the relationship of the research studied. There are two types of interpretation. The first method is a narrow and frequent use of the term interpretation and refers to the relations within the research study and its data. In this regard, interpretation and analysis "are intertwined ... as one almost automatically interprets as one analyzes." The second method seeks a broader meaning of the research data by comparing the results and inferences drawn in the first method to theory and other research results. In other words, the meaning and implications are sought "between one's research results and conclusions either of one's own or of other researchers.

1.8 Organization of the Study

This study follows the above format of analysis and interpretation. The next four chapters (Chapters 3 to 6) will be strictly an analysis and simple interpretation of the research study and its data. One chapter each will be devoted to an analysis and simple interpretation of the main variables used in the study: regime legitimacy (Chapter 3), disposition to intervene (Chapter 4), and opportunity to intervene (Chapter 5). A deeper analysis using statistical tools will be dealt with in Chapter 6. The chapter on the implications of the study (Chapter 8) will deal with the second method and broader meaning of data interpretation. The results and inferences drawn within the research data are compared with other research results and conclusions.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

A survey of a military group would consider the unique assignment situation. Sometimes, selected respondents are hard to reach particularly if they are assigned in relatively inaccessible areas. This includes situations where the respondents are either conducting operations in remote areas, serving aboard ship, or schooling abroad. In such cases, a longer period of survey as well as replacement of respondents are needed. Also, self-administered questionnaire does not offer adequate control particularly when respondents are left on their own to answer it. This study, therefore, recognizes these limitations in the conduct of the

survey.

2.1 The Armed Forces of the Philippines

The politicization of the Philippine military may be better understood by tracing its roots and development since the pre-Spanish period. It may be observed from Philippine history that Filipino soldiers tend to follow two tendencies: either resistance or subservience to their indigenous or foreign rulers.

2.11 Resistance against

Spanish Conquest

A book on military history of the Philippines, a required reading in History of Military Art at the Philippine Military Academy, starts with the Battle of Mactan and depicts the first Filipino resistance against the Spanish conquest. It narrates how Lapu Lapu, the native chieftain of Mactan Island, led his followers in an organized resistance against the invading Spaniards led by Magellan. Based on the account of Pigafetta, Magellan's chronicler, Baclagon noted Magellan's errors including the lack of preparatory planning particularly gathering information about the island and the capabilities of the inhabitants, the attack of Lapu-Lapu's superior force frontally and the inability to commit the force of Rajah Humabon who was willing and ready to help him. In short, Magellan became overconfident by the superiority of his arms that he underestimated Lapu-Lapu and his men. On the other hand, Lapu-Lapu displayed better judgment, leadership and tactical skill by applying the principle of concentration of combat power through numerical superiority that allowed him to maneuver a double envelopment that finally resulted in the defeat of Magellan, who later was mortally wounded, and his troops.

Despite initial native opposition to the conquest, the Spaniards by their superior weaponry gradually conquered Luzon and Visayas and ruled the islands for more than three centuries.

But the Spanish rule was deeply resented by the natives because of its oppressive policies that include the levying of tribute, imposition of forced labor, abuses and corruption of the Spanish officials, the arrogance and discrimination showed by the Spaniards. These grievances were expressed in major revolts, particularly the revolt of Lakandula and Soliman, chieftains of Manila settlements in 1570-1571 against Miguel Lopez de Legaspi and Martin de Goite; the Tamblot's rebellion in Bohol in 1622; the Leyte revolt of 1622; Caraga revolts (Mindanao) in 1630; the Cagayan insurrection in 1639; the Visayan revolt of 1649-1650; Malong's rebellion in Pangasinan, 1660; Dagohoy's rebellion in Bohol, 1774; revolt of Diego Silang, 1863. The rebellions were characterized with the wide use of guerilla tactics in which superiority in number and arms of the Spaniards were overcome by stealth fighting, ambush and raids.

Reviewing the events of the period, O.D. Corpuz remarked:

Whether the barangays submitted to the Spaniards meekly, or welcomed them in friendship, or resisted with arms and overcome by force, the colonial regime weighed down heavily upon them all....They contained their sense of loss and oppression patiently,initially reposing trust in the Spanish king, but in the end they staked everything toward rebellion and death, because the regime could not give them justice.

2.12 Filipinos in the Armed

Services of Spain

During the Spanish period, the Spaniards enlisted Filipinos in their wars and campaigns against foreign forces or even against Filipinos themselves. Baclagon cited some reasons for this fact to include: their adventurous spirit which make them love military life, prospect of good pay and a respectable status in society, the need to supplement Spain's small number of troops in the island, and the lack of cohesive or nationalistic feelings among Filipinos. Apart from quelling native revolts, Filipinos helped the Spaniards won wars against the Chinese, Dutch, Moros and the British, specifically against the Limahong expedition, the expeditions to the Moluccas in 1580 and 1583, the Chinese revolt of 1603, the war against the Dutch in 1647, expeditions to Mindanao and Jolo, and against the English invasion of the Philippines in 1762.

Baclagon noted, however, that "when the Filipino revolts started to occur and some of these soldiers actually deserted to join the rebel forces, quite a number of prominent Spaniards began to express disgust and fear toward these Filipino units."

2.13 The Philippine Revolution and the

Philippine-American War

While the early revolts showed common feelings of Spanish oppression and injustices among the natives, there was no common effort against redressing them. The revolts "did not take place simultaneously but one after another, depending upon the patience of the people and the presence of a leader in the locality." Lacking unity, therefore, these early revolts resulted in failure.

The spread of liberal ideas in the 19th century, however,

encouraged the rise of Filipino leaders. Along with the increased knowledge of the natives, this caused the growth of national consciousness. Initially disavowing separation from Spain, early Filipino leaders merely sought reforms, such as changing the military form of government to civilian rule, the recall of Spanish friars and secularization of parishes, representation in the Spanish Cortes, and equal treatment of the law before court of justice. Under dominant monastic influence, the Spanish clergy became alarmed with growing nationalism and attempted to suppress it. With the failed insurrection in Cavite Arsenals in 1872, the clergy took it as an opportunity to railroad the execution of Filipino priests who were heading the secularization movement: Burgos, Gomez and Zamora. This further inflamed the nationalist movement, which led to the founding of the Katipunan by Andres Bonifacio. Imbued with the ideals of the French revolution, the Katipunan advocated an armed revolt. Urged to join it, Rizal declined as "the revolution was ill-timed and lacked preparation, because the cultured element and plutocracy did not support it, and that without arms, ships and the support referred to, failure was sure to ensue..." Hearing this, Bonifacio was incensed, "Thunder! whoever did Dr. Rizal read that for a revolution you must first have arms and ships? Where did he hear it?"

Bonifacio finally launched the revolution. Starting in Manila, it spread out to other parts of the country. In Cavite Aguinaldo made remarkable victories against Spanish troops. Compared with the marginal battle achievements of Bonifacio, this caused a leadership struggle in the movement. This was resolved in favor of Aguinaldo who assumed the leadership after Bonifacio was tried and executed for treason.

The revolution created a momentum that forced the Spaniards to seek a truce. This led to the pact at Biaknabato that stipulated the cessation of hostilities and the exile of Aguinaldo to Hongkong.

At this time, there was a strained relationship between the United States and Spain on Cuba. With the start of the Spanish-American war, the Americans sought to secure Filipino cooperation in a joint cause against Spain by promising independence. Thus, Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey met in Hongkong for this purpose.

Upon return from Hongkong in May, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation war against Spain. Establishing a dictatorial government, he organized the Philippine Army on February 2, 1889. All Filipino citizens between 18 to 35 were conscripted and territorial mobilization was directed.

When Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet anchored at Manila Bay on May 7, 1898, he sent a liaison to Aquinaldo and encouraged him to reactivate the revolt to contain the Spaniards in Manila. This was followed later with mock war between the Spaniards and the Americans.

Uprisings spread with spontaneity in almost all parts of the country. Rebel victories followed one after another and soon Aguinaldo was congratulated by Admiral Dewey. Believing that the Americans merely wished to help the Filipinos, as they did the Cubans, to gain freedom, Aguinaldo proclaimed independence on June 12, 1898, reorganized a revolutionary government and formed a cabinet. He also organized the local governments all over the country.

But when Spain was paid by the $20 million indemnity, Aguinaldo realized that the Filipinos would be left out. Also, the actions of American commanders in the capture of Manila showed no intention of turning over the country to the Filipinos. Aguinaldo refused to recognize the transfer of sovereignty. He declared the independence of the Philippines on June 12, 1898 and established Malolos as its capital.

The antagonism between the Filipino and American forces broke out on February 4, 1899. Confronted with superior forces and arms, the Filipinos gradually retreated into mountain strongholds and launched guerilla warfare. The violent repressive measures of the Americans in subduing guerillas were quite ineffective as it aroused more indignation and defiance. The guerilla movement, however, collapsed with the capture of Aguinaldo and his subsequent surrender proclamation. But several of his followers opted to carry on the struggle to include Generals Lukban, Malvar, Noriel, and Sakay. Because of their leadership, hostilities went on in Batangas, Mindoro, Cebu, Bohol and Samar.

The fighting capability of Filipino soldiers drew the admiration of General Lawton with this remark: "Taking into account the disadvantages they have to fight against in arms, equipment and military discipline, they are the bravest men I have ever seen."

2.15 The American Occupation

With the establishment of the civil government and to restore peace and order, the U.S. government opted for a non-military approach by establishing the Philippine Constabulary. This was justified in that "the U.S. Army in the Philippines had neither the will nor the organization to do police work, or take part in the maintenance of order or suppression of crime... its job was to put down armed insurrections that had got beyond the control of civil authorities."

The integrated police system operated in the pacified areas in Luzon and Visayas particularly when military rule was lifted in 1904. Because of peace and order problems, Sulu and Mindanao were governed by special laws.

Filipino constables won the admiration of PC Chief Henry Allen. In a report to Washington, Allen lauded them for being "unquestionably more efficient than the Americans."

In 1934 the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Law that provided for a ten-year transition Commonwealth government and the setting of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946.

Put in-charge with the defense of the Philippines, Gen. McArthur planned for a concept of operations based on a defensive-offensive type of warfare with forces concentrated in Luzon.

2.16 The Japanese Occupation and

Liberation Period

At the start of the war, the Japanese managed to gain control of the air that contributed to the success of landing operations. However, the Filipino-American USAFFE forces retreated to Bataan without pressure from both flanks. In Bataan they were able to consolidate and make a formidable defense, which unnecessarily delayed the Japanese campaign timetable.

Just like the Americans at the turn of the century, the Japanese military administration formulated a policy of pacification. To augment their regular troops, the Japanese used indigenous personnel to maintain peace and order by organizing the Bureau of Constabulary on May 4, 1942.

Increasing the size of the Constabulary to 40,000 in November 1943, then President Jose P. Laurel also encouraged the establishment of regular training schools to improve the quality of service. The course usually lasted for three months.

Tasked to fight the guerillas, some members of the PC turned up either as guerillas themselves or cooperating with the guerillas. Particularly during the term of Major General Guillermo Franscisco, who belonged to Class 1908 of PC Officers School, as Director of the Constabulary, vital intelligence information were passed to guerilla units that eventually reached the Allied Headquarters in Australia. The PC was later plagued with desertions particularly at the later part of the war.

2.17 1946-1986 Period

The politicization of the military since World War II has been influenced primarily by factors exogenous to the institution. Specifically, its politicization is founded initially upon "the protracted period of armed challenges to weak

constitutional rule, the fragility of political institutions, and the ineffectivity of political governance ... which required the intervention of the military."

Immediately after the independence, the country was faced with a rebellion coming from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the Hukbalahaps or Huks. As a background the local communists took arms against the Japanese in 1942. The war gave the Huks "the opportunity to institute a system of discipline, to arm them with weapons from the US army, and to test their tactics and tactics in many pitched against the Japanese." In 1946 the Huks numbering 10,000 were concentrated north and south of Manila.

Succeeding the presidency after the death of Roxas, President Quirino adopted a policy of leniency by offering amnesty to all dissidents who willingly surrendered and gave up their arms. The policy failed, however, when the Huks returned to the field after a few months. To strengthen the military its counterinsurgency campaign, the government undertook two major policies: it merged the Philippine Constabulary with the Philippine Army in 1949 and organized the troops into a fully-equipped Battalion Combat Teams. In 1950 Magsaysay became Defense Secretary. Shortly in October, he managed to arrest the Huk Politburo that strongly weakened the rebellion. In addition, Magsaysay organized EDCOR, a socioeconomic program of rehabilitation for Huk surrenderees. The twin policies of armed suppression and peaceful rehabilitation finally broke the backbone of the Huk rebellion.

The AFP also sent its troops abroad. They fought in Korea under a United Nations mandate. They also went to Vietnam in 1966 to 1969 as a civic action contingent building roads, bridges, schools and airstrips.

When President Marcos took over in 1966, the military became more involved in nonmilitary tasks particularly in roadbuilding projects. When Martial Law was declared, the military became more of a partner to the regime as implementor of its policies. This allowed the military to expand its role from mere influence to participation in the political process involving judicial, administrative, and industrial management functions.

In January 1981 martial law was lifted since the threats of communist rebellion and Muslim secessionist movement had decreased substantially. The political and economic situation, however, continued to deteriorate particularly when Senator Aquino was assassinated in August 1983. This led to the formation of the Reform Armed Forces Movement (RAM) composed of young and idealistic officers who launched a campaign against issues such as the "widespread corruption in the military, the lack of professionalism, promotions based on favoritism, and overstaying generals who blocked the younger generations career advancement."

Specifically on August 21, 1985, the RAM formed an 11-man Adhoc Steering Committee with the following as its objectives: to fight graft and corruption in the AFP; to ask for promotions based on performance, merit, seniority and fairness; to work for better medical attention and services; to eliminate the "bata-bata system"; and to improve logistical support for the officers and men fighting insurgency in the field.

President Marcos acceded to the holding of a snap presidential election in which he and Mrs. Corazon Aquino became the candidates. Held on February 7, 1986 the presidential election became highly controversial. Finally on February 22, 1986 Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos proclaimed a military revolt to seek ouster of Marcos and declaration of Aquino as winner in the presidential election. Seeking refuge at Camp Aguinaldo, the reformist forces defied the government forces and drew support from sympathetic military commanders, the political opposition, and the masses. This tipped the balance of power in favor of the rebels. On February 25, Marcos finally left Malacanang with his family and advisers. This paved the way for a transition government with Aquino as the new President.

The RAM Manifesto explains the rationale of the organization in spearheading military intervention of February 1986:

It is our basic aim to establish a unique martial tradition for the nation which envisages that in the event we are compelled to intervene in the political life of the nation to save it, the Members pledge to each other, that they shall not exercise political power, and that they shall return to the barracks when the sovereign will of the people has prevailed.

The military involvement at EDSA was justified by General Jose Almonte as a case of "a man saving another drowning man"; that is, the soldiers saving the nation.

2.18 The Post-1986 Period

From 1986 to the present there had been several attempts of military intervention, which make "the AFP as a potentially decisive political force in our society." These include: the February 1986 coup cum revolution, the July 1986 Manila Hotel incident, the November 1986 "God Save the Queen" plot, the January 1987 GMA 7 incident, the April 1987 "Black Saturday" incident, the July 1987 takeover plot of the Manila International Airport, the August 1987 coup attempt, and the December 1989 coup attempt. Considered the most dangerous threat against the Aquino regime was the "God Save the Queen" plot as it had the characteristic of a chain-of-command takeover. However, Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos did not go along with, resisted and contained the plot.

The causes of these coups, particularly that of the December 1989 coup attempt, were identified. For those involved, the following reasons were advanced: failure of the government to deliver basic services; graft and corruption; too much partisan politics, bureaucratic inefficiency, poor and non-responsive military leadership, lack of genuine reconciliation, uneven treatment of human rights violation committed by the military and the communist armed group, absence of good government, softness on the communist and left-leaning armed groups, and failure of the leadership to address socio-economic problems. Those who fought on the side of the government advanced the same reasons to include: obsession with power which they thought they had won but handed over to Aquino in February 1986, material considerations of coup leaders, personal grievances, strong fraternal or personal ties, naive idealism, and messianic complex.

2.2 The Philippine Military Academy

As a major institution of the AFP, the PMA indicates in its roots and development the same two tendencies of resistance and subservience to native or foreign rulers. The latter is the more dominant trend, however, except in recent years when PMA cadets as well as alumni overtly supported military intervention in politics.

The politicization of the military is not only due to the postwar politicization of the country but also to "the demographic character of recruits to the military's officer corps."

The Philippine Military Academy as an institution will be discussed at length not only because its alumni are the respondents of this study but also of its role in the professional socialization of the core of the AFP officer corps.

2.21 The Spanish Period

During the Spanish period, an Academia General Militar was established with the objective, "to allow sons of military men resident in the colonies to enter the militia and to enable soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the army to become officers." Conducted for three years, the course taught include basic subjects of geography, history, and mathematics as well as practical courses in fortification, topography, and artillery. Selected graduates were further sent to the General Military Academy of Spain in Toledo.

2.22 The Revolutionary Period

With the promulgation of the Philippine Republic, Aguinaldo ordered the formation of a military academy on October 25, 1898 in Malolos, Bulacan. With sessions to start on November 1, the classes were divided into two sections, one for field officers from colonels to majors, and the other from Captains and below. After finishing the course, graduates became regular officers of the army. The course of instruction was divided into two parts. The first part consisted of current orders and regulations, field and garrison regulations, military justice and penal laws. The second part included arithmetic and military accountability, geography and history, field fortifications, and map drawing and reading. Based on the directive, its first director was Manuel Sityar. The Academia Militar was housed in the convent of Barasoain together with the Univesidad de Pilipinas and Institute Burgos. It was cut short by the capture of Aguinaldo in 1901.

2.23 The American Period

With the establishment of the Philippine Constabulary, the PC Officers School was organized on February 17, 1905 at the Sta. Lucia Barracks in Intramuros, Manila. Its formation was made imperative by the breakdown in the effectiveness among Constabulary officers because of enlarged responsibilities and expanded jurisdiction.

The PC Officers' School was later transferred to Baguio City in 1908. Starting with a three-month course, the curriculum was expanded to a six-month course in 1908; then, to a nine-month course in 1916; a two-year course in 1919; and a three-year course in 1928. In the same year, the school was renamed as Philippine Constabulary Academy. Finally, based on the National Defense Act of 1935, a four-year course for a Bachelor of Science degree was introduced in 1935. Simultaneously, the institution was changed to the present Philippine Military Academy. The formation of the PMA was guided by the alumni of the US Military Academy at West Point including then Lieutenant Colonels Eisenhower and Ord who drafted the plans and had Colonel Duckworth-Ford as its first superintendent.

The influence of West Pointers paved the way for the adoption of the West Point system in the PMA's academic curriculum and military practices, as manifested in the engineering-oriented curriculum, the honor code, the fourth class system, and the cadet uniform itself consisting of cadet gray, glittering bell buttons, shako, and streamlined chevrons.

In describing the West Point system, which the other U.S. military academies have also adopted, Lovell points to its emphasis upon the development of the "whole man." This type of education and training has mathematics as the core of intellectual discipline, which is consistent with the classical educational thought such as the one described in Plato's Republic. Lovell further characterizes it as basically the creative synthesis of Sparta and Athens involving a solid academic education (Athenian) as well as military discipline and physical training (Spartan). Specifically, "the Spartan ideals are those of the noble warrior: austerity, discipline, the comradeship of arms, devotion to the state and, above all, a commitment to the heroic deeds and a love of glory. Athenian ideals, in contrast, are especially of culture and learning."

This system of education was introduced by Sylvanus Thayer, superintendent of West Point from 1817 to 1833. Thayer drew this vision of a seminary-academy from the French method of technical education, which combined both the Athenian and Spartan ideals. Specifically, West Point was modeled closely after the educational system of Ecole Polytechnique of Paris which had mainly an engineering education.

A main feature of the West Point system is the fourth class system. It refers to the Plebe or first year period of training which provides the cadet a transition from civilian to military life. A deliberate period of testing, it requires a plebe to "stand on his own feet, to function properly under pressure, respond promptly and intelligently to orders, measure up to the highest standards of character, sense of value and discipline."

The selection of cadets to PMA during this period was quite stiff. In 1940, for example, out of 6000 aspirants who took the entrance examination all over the country, only 120 joined the class of 1940.

The fourth class system was proven effective by the excellent record of PMA Classes 1944 and 1945 during the war. Disbanded at the start of the war when they were on or just finished plebe year, they enlisted in the army or organized guerilla forces throughout the country.

2.24 The Japanese Period

During the Japanese period, a Constabulary Academy in different areas was established to educate and professionalize the ranks of the Constabulary. The first branches of the Academy were organized in Araullo High School in Intramuros and Torres in Tondo, 1 Sept 1942. This was later followed by other branches in Gagalangin barracks in Tondo, Santa Lucia Barracks in Intramuros, as well as in provincial areas in Camp Allen, Baguio and Cebu.

2.25 The 1946 to 1986 Period

The PMA was reactivated and reopened on May 5, 1947. Graduates of West Point continued to have a strong influence on the PMA. Lieutenant Colonel Tirso Fajardo, a graduate of West Point in 1934 and member of the pre-war academics group became its second superintendent. The West Point system, therefore, continued to be adopted to include the academic and physical education curriculum, honor code and the fourth class system. Applicants are selected according to district representation and competitive examination and must fulfill the requirements of being a high school graduate and with an age range from 17 to 22 years old.

A new site for the PMA was constructed at Loakan, Baguio City in 1947. It was appropriately named after Gen. Gregorio del Pilar who died in battle at the age of 24 which is just about the average age of a graduating cadet. With Del Pilar's high sense of nationalism and idealism, the cadets are subtly encouraged to emulate and identify themselves with the hero and particularly with his brief and glorious career. His relevance to the cadets can be summed up by a writer's comment: "Gregorio del Pilar died for the country and for the Commander-in-Chief (Gen. Aguinaldo, his friend). What higher form of loyalty is there?"

Nationalistic fervor continued to be felt at PMA particularly when the use of Pilipino commands was adopted in 1967. This was later adopted by the AFP in the 1970s. The English nomenclature of the cadet companies in which the Cadet Corps was organized was changed on September 1, 1976. With the increase in the number of cadets, the four traditional phonetic company names - Alfa, Bravo, Charlie and Delta - were dissolved and cadets were distributed at random to the newly organized companies named after six decisive battles in Philippine history: Bessang, Tirad, Pinaglabanan, Bud Dajo, Mactan and Imus. However, Filipinization of company designation was shortlived. In May 1977 with the appointment of a West Point graduate as Superintendent, the cadet companies reverted back to old phonetic designations with Echo and Foxtrot added.

The early 1970s was marked by the defection to the New People's Army of 1lt Victor Corpus, an alumnus, while serving as staff at the PMA. The Academy Scribe describes the sentiments of the cadets of his defection: "While the bravery shown by Corpus in advancing his principles and convictions brought him a certain amount of admiration from the Cadet Corps, his actuations against his own Alma Mater somehow united the cadets in denouncing him."

Generally the value system of the AFP and the PMA during this period reflects the ideals of civil control as shown in the following statement:

The fact that retired military men go on politics rather than standing aloof and contemptuous of the democratic political process as they do in some countries means as there is not, at present, a deep division between politicians and military men, for they share roughly the same value system. They do not represent a separate professional military class with its own traditions and way of life, as in pre-war Germany or Japan. The officers and men of the Philippine Armed Forces are drawn from the general population, to which they return, the officers trained at the Philippine Military Academy are brought up in the tradition of the supremacy of civil authority. The problem in the Philippines is not so much one of the military taking over the government by coup d'etat as of keeping the Armed Forces free from gross political interference by Congress and the local authorities..."

This attitude, however, changed markedly in 1986.

2.25 The Post-1986 Period

It was noted earlier that the politicization of the military is primarily a product of the post-war politicization of the country. Military politicization is also the result of endogenous factor particularly the demographic character of recruits to the officer corps. Miranda, in an ongoing study of PMA cadets belonging to Classes 1951 to 1991, reveals some interesting findings about trends in the recruitment of cadets that predispose them toward politicization. Specifically, these trends include: the recruitment of cadets that come from socioeconomically better-off families and with parents who are mostly college graduates; almost 90% of the cadets had attended college before entering the PMA with about two-thirds of them coming from the best Philippine universities and colleges; and about half of the cadets have relatives in the military.

In February 1986 when the EDSA Revolution took place, the cadets sided with the rebels. Again the Academy Scribe gives a vivid description of the event:

Within the walls of the Philippine Military Academy, confusion and tension rose. A national crisis was on the run, giving each cadet a feeling of fear and uncertainty. Uncertainty not only to the Academy and its reputation but uncertainty to their future and their family. And so it came that each member of the Cadet Corps was asked to decide on whom they would side. Finally, the majority decided that they would defend and uphold the Nation's integrity under the rebel's wings, led by General Fidel Ramos and Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. With this the rest of the cadets swiftly followed. While the Revolution was at its peak, the Cadet Corps was armed and ready, waiting for orders to come down.

For this support the Cadet Corps was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation Badge along with other units who actively supported the Revolution.

The subsequent political unrest did not spare the PMA. In March 1987, a few days before the graduation ceremony in which President Aquino was invited as main speaker, the roof of the PMA grandstand was torned down in a bomb explosion in which four died and 43 were injured.

During the August 1987 coup attempt, the Cadet Corps came up openly in support of the rebel cause. A one page resolution called "Expression of Sentiments," the four classes of the Cadet Corps (1988 to 1991) gave their stand on three points: that politicians observe a hands-off policy on purely military affairs; that the persons in authority must exercise justice and good sense in dealing with the rebel soldiers; and that there shall be a dialogue between the government and the rebel representatives with full media coverage.

The cadets also planned to go on strike but this did not push through after the PMA officials conducted dialogues with them to settle their grievances.

The efforts of AFP and PMA officials to isolate the PMA cadets from military intervention seem to bear fruit when no cadets were involved at all in the 1989 coup attempt.

What is the proportion of PMA graduates who were involved in a coup as compared to non-PMA graduates?

In a fact-finding investigation of the 1989 coup attempt, the Davide Commission came out with a report showing that 210 or 9.4% of PMA graduates were involved in the coup attempt as compared to 259 or 2.2% of non-PMA graduates (see table 2.1). The Commission concluded that although "the major players of the December 1989 coup came from the country's military school, the figures bear out the fact that rebel PMA alumni are an aberration, not the norm."

What could be the reasons why some PMA graduates involve themselves in coup attempts? One aspect may be found in the military professional socialization of its officer corps at the Philippine Military Academy. Specifically, the demographic character of PMA cadets indicate politically-inclined individuals based on their generally middle class socioeconomic and superior educational backgrounds. This political awareness and sensitivity are further developed at the PMA where they imbibed high ideals such as love of country, honor and leadership by example. Exposure to military and civilian superiors who lack these ideals is frustrating particularly to new graduates. This is aggravated when motivational interests that the military closely identify with are perceived to be endangered. These motives include: the interests of the nation, the interests of the socioeconomic class the military identify and corporate and individual self-interests.

2.3 Summary

Since the pre-Spanish period, Filipino soldiers tend to follow two tendencies regarding their relationship to either indigenous or foreign rulers.

The first tendency is resistance against perceived injustice and oppression whether under a foreign or native ruler. This is exemplified by succession of disparate revolts against the oppressive Spanish rule, which later led to a national revolution culminating in the founding of the short-lived Philippine Republic of 1898. With the Spaniards almost defeated, the Americans who were initially an ally showed its imperialist ambitions and this led to the Philippine-American war. Even with the superiority of American arms, the Filipinos fought fiercely. When conventional warfare became untenable for the Filipinos, they shifted to guerilla warfare. Even with the capture of Aguinaldo, many of his generals continued the struggle for a number of years. When the Japanese invaded the Philippines in the 1940s, the Filipinos fought bravely under the Americans. After the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, Filipinos continued to fight as guerillas until the country was liberated. After independence armed resistance to the government was launched by the local communists in the 1950s. Suffering setbacks and becoming dormant afterwards, the Communist Party of the Philippines was revitalized in the 1960s by a new set of leaders. Since then, its military arm, the New People Army, has been fighting the government forces. Some Filipino Muslims, who vigorously resisted the Spaniard and the American rule, are demanding secession from the Philippines. Finally, the latest phenomenon of resistance came from the military rebels. After triggering the coup cum revolution of 1986 that brought down the authoritarian rule of Marcos and installed Aquino, the military rebels led a series of coup attempts against the Aquino regime.

The second military tendency, on the other hand, is a history of subservience to a foreign or native rule. The Filipinos became valuable soldiers in the service of colonial Spain, United States and Japan. After independence the military generally follow civilian supremacy except in later years when some military factions led a series of coup attempts against the Aquino regime.

Given these two military tendencies, it may be assumed that under a perceived injustice or oppression, Filipino soldiers tend to rebel. However, under a relatively enlightened leadership, they tend to be loyal followers.

The politicization of the Philippine military since World War II has been influenced by factors both exogenous and endogenous to the institution. Primarily, military politicization is founded on the politicization of the society itself, which is characterized by a general lack of compromise and the use of open violence in the political process common in Third World countries. In the Philippines, this condition resulted in a low state and regime legitimacy manifested in a weak constitutional rule, fragile political institutions, and ineffective political governance. Consequently, armed groups posed a challenge to the regime that required the intervention of the military. The country has been confronted by three major armed groups: the CPP-NPA, the Muslim secessionists and the military rebels itself.

The politicization of the military is also a product of endogenous factor. One aspect may be found in the military professional socialization of its officer corps at the Philippine Military Academy. Specifically, the demographic character of PMA cadets indicate politically-inclined individuals based on their generally middle class socioeconomic and superior educational backgrounds. This observation of high political awareness and sensitivity among PMA cadets and alumni was borne out in the past coup attempts. The PMA cadets openly supported the February 1986 and August 1987 coups, while PMA graduates played dominant roles in the series of coup attempts against the Aquino regimes.

3.1 Profile of Respondents

A representative survey ideally requires that the major elements of the survey population be proportionately represented in the survey sample. With rank and branch of service as principal categories, the sample respondents are proportioned based on the strength of the AFP regular officer corps.

As table 3.1 shows, the profile of 500 respondents reveal the following characteristics:

1. Categorized by rank variable, the sample respondents are proportionally represented by the: general rank (2%), colonel (10%), lieutenant colonel (7%), major (7%), captain (27%), first lieutenant (27%), and second lieutenant (19%). On the other hand, sample respondents by branch of service have these proportions: Philippine Army (40%), Philippine Constabulary (30%), Philippine Air Force (13%), and Philippine Navy (18%). The figures indicate that most of the respondents come from the ranks of captain and first lieutenant (54%). The figures by branch of service show that seven out of ten respondents (70%) come from the ground or land-based forces (the PA and PC). The rest (31%) of the respondents are from the technical or the air- and sea-based forces (the PAF and PN).

2. By age groups, seven out of ten respondents (70%) are between 21 to 35 years old (see table 3.2). By length of military service, almost the same number of respondents (68%) is between one to 15 years of service (table 3.3). This means that three fourths of the regular officer corps are relatively young in age and new in the service.

3. On birthplace by region, more than one-third of the respondents come from the National Capital Region and Region 4, one-sixth (17%) from Region 1, less than one-tenth each from Region 3 (9%) and Region 6 (8%), and the rest come from the other regions (varying between 1% to 6%) (see table 3.4).

4. About one-sixth of the respondents (17%), who are mostly senior officers, have finished their graduate education with those in the Philippine Navy having the highest percentage (23%), followed by those in the Philippine Air Force (18%), Philippine Constabulary (17%), and Philippine Army (15%) (see table 3.5).

5. Regarding the educational attainment of the respondents' parents, more than three-fourths (68%) have gone to college. About half of the fathers (51%) and mothers (47%) have finished either a college or graduate education (table 3.6). The high educational attainment of majority of the respondents' parents indicates a generally middle class background of the respondents.

6. Categorizing the parents' educational attainment by the respondents' ranks shows that company-grade respondents (lieutenants and captains) have majority of the parents (48 to 53%) finishing a college education as compared to the field-grade respondents (39 to 42%) (table 3.7). This may suggest the increasing sophistication of the PMA-trained officers in terms of family socio-economic background.

7. Generally, all respondents have relatives in the military. Almost four out of 10 (38%) have first-degree relatives either as parents, children, brothers or sisters (table 3.8).

The profile of the respondents discussed above generally support an earlier finding by Miranda based on demographic data of 7000 PMA cadets from Classes 1951 to 1959. The findings reveal a trend of cadet recruitment coming from socio-economically better-off families, with majority of the parents having college degrees, and with sizeable number having close relatives in the military.

3.2 Regime Legitimacy

The concept of regime legitimacy is discussed in detail in section 1.62. It is categorized in terms of civil legitimacy or consent of the people and performance legitimacy or the ability of the regime to govern.

3.21 Perceptions of Civil

Legitimacy

Civil legitimacy is the primary basis of legitimacy at the national level. Operationally defined in terms of consent of the

people, it has as indicators the results of elections, referenda and survey opinion.

In this study, the civil legitimacy of the regime will be indicated by the respondents' perceptions of the trustworthiness of the regime's key political institutions and their leadership: the Office of the President, the Congress and the Supreme Court. In addition, the manner in which the respondents voted in the Constitutional plebiscite and in recent elections will be considered.

and personalities

As tables 3.9 and 3.10 show, the trustworthiness of the four key political institutions of government along with their leaders are shown (see also charts 3.1 and 3.2).

The judiciary is most trusted among the three political branches of government. Large majority trust rating (68%) and margin of trust (+58%) are accorded the Supreme Court. Also, the majority of the respondents trust its Chief Justice, Marcelo Fernan (51%).

The high trust rating of the Supreme Court is in contrast with the low trust ratings of the other three government institutions: the Office of the President (36%), the Senate (30%) and the House of Representatives (23%). Overall, these four institutions garner a frequency mean index of 39% (a low trust rating) and a positive low margin of trust of 9%.

The trust ratings of the personalities representing these institutions range from a neutral trust rating for Senate President Jovito Salonga (42%), a little but bordering on neutral trust for President Corazon Aquino (39%) with a barely positive margin of trust (+1), and a very little trust for Speaker Ramon Mitra (19%).

The overall frequency mean rating of these four personalities is 38% (a little trust rating bordering on neutral trust) and a positive single-digit margin of trust of +6%.

As table 3.11 shows, the perceptions of the respondents on the trustworthiness of institutions/personalities in the executive branch of our government are indicated. As compared to the Office of the President, much lower ratings are received by officials in the local government (11%) and barangay (21%).

The lower ratings of institutions and personalities of the civilian government are in contrast with the institutions and personalities associated with the military. As table 3.12 shows, clear trust ratings are received by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (68%) and the Department of National Defense (61%). Although falling under the neutral trust scale, the majority of the respondents give trust ratings to General Renato de Villa (58%) and Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos (50%).

The respondents were asked on whom among the two presidential contenders won in the 1986 election. As table 3.13 shows, the results indicate a clear split opinion: Aquino (29%), Marcos (26%) and neutral or no opinion (32%).

Categorized into branches of service, support for Aquino varied from more than a third (37%) of the PC to less than a fourth (23%) of the PAF respondents. Among the rank groups, the lieutenant colonels are most supportive (42%), while the lieutenants (27% and 25%) are the least supportive.

As regards the 1987 Constitution, two-thirds of the respondents (66%) disagree with the manner it was formulated and adopted (see table 3.14). They prefer that the commissioners should have been elected rather than merely selected and appointed. By branch of service, PA respondents register the most dissension (72%) while the PN respondents give the least disagreement (55%). By rank the generals are most supportive (58%) while the lieutenant colonels and the first lieutenants give only minimal support (14% and 22%).

Because of this disapproval, only a little more than one-third of the respondents (35%) voted "Yes" for its ratification on February 2, 1987. The majority (51%) voted "No." Categorized by branch of service, support for Constitutional ratification ranges from less than half of the respondents from the Philippine Navy (47%) to only about one-fourth from the Philippine Constabulary (26%). Among the rank groups, the colonels (48%) are most supportive of the Constitution, while the lieutenants (29 and 26%) are least supportive. It is worthwhile to note that only one-third of the generals (33%) favor the Constitution while two-thirds (67%) are against ratification (see table 3.15)

This reservation for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution conforms with actual plebiscite results in polling precincts with predominantly military voters (table 3.16). Clustered around military camps, these polling precincts contained these plebiscite results: 27,904 or 42% of the total voters, "Yes"; 38,718 or 58%, "No."

The large negative votes predominated in all these precincts. The results by major branches of service including the General Headquarters were: GHQ and attached units (37% Yes, 63% No); Philippine Navy (42% Yes, 58% No), Philippine Air Force (41% Yes, 59% No); Philippine Constabulary (47% Yes, 53% No); and Philippine Army (42% Yes, 58% No).

The negative military votes cast in these polling precincts were in contrast with the national trend of an overwhelming vote in favor of constitutional ratification. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) declared the following plebiscite results: 16,622,111 or 77.04% in favor of ratification; 4,954,373 or 22.96% against; and 209,730 abstention.

It may be concluded that the respondents view the civil legitimacy of the regime to be low as evident by the generally low trust ratings of the top government institutions and personalities. Also, the negative votes cast by the respondents in the ratification of the 1987 Constitution attest to this fact. The reservation of the military against Constitutional ratification is also confirmed in COMELEC results of polling precincts with predominantly military voters. A primary reason for this reservation is that the respondents disagree strongly with the manner in which the Constitution was formulated and adopted. They would have preferred that the 48 commissioners who drafted the Constitution should have been elected rather than appointed by President Aquino.

3.22 Perceptions of Performance

Legitimacy

One way to achieve legitimacy is through performance or success legitimacy, particularly through "success in war, and the maintenance of prosperity, order, peace." Thus, performance legitimacy may be operationalized in terms of the ability of the civilian government to govern. There will be two indicators of government performance: (a) perceptions of the performance of key government institutions and personalities; and (b) perceptions of government performance in addressing certain national problems and issues.

As tables 3.17 and 3.18 show, the respondents' perceptions of performance satisfaction of the four key political institutions of government and their primary occupants are indicated (see also charts 3.3 and 3.4)

The preeminent trust rating of the judiciary is also duplicated by a satisfactory performance rating of the Supreme Court (+55%).

In contrast, the other three major institutions of the Charts 3.3 and 3.4 government receive very low performance satisfaction ratings as well as negative margin of performance satisfaction ratings.

Satisfaction of the performance of the Office of the President is only perceived by less than one-fifth (19%) of the respondents with a clear majority (57%) unsatisfied. This is analogous to the performance ratings of President Aquino who is a few points higher (23%) but with still a majority (54%) not satisfied with her performance. Overall, based on the margin of satisfaction ratings, President Aquino is perceived to have performed better, as indicated by a positive margin rating (+1%), compared with the Office of the President which has a high negative margin rating

(-38%).

Only more than a third of the respondents are satisfied with Senate President Jovito Salonga (35%), almost an equal number are impartial (36%), and less than three-tenths (28%) are dissatisfied. This gives him a positive margin of satisfaction of 16%. On the other hand, the Senate has much lower satisfaction ratings (23%) and a negative margin of satisfaction of 20%.

Speaker Ramon Mitra has the lowest satisfaction rating (19%) among the four key government officials with a negative margin of satisfaction of 26%. Similarly, the House of Representative obtains lower ratings in terms of performance satisfaction (16%) and negative margin of satisfaction (-27%).

Overall, the performance satisfaction rating of the four major government institutions are low as indicated by a frequency mean of 28% and a negative margin mean of -12%.

Assessing solely the performance of the executive department indicates a very low performance satisfaction. As table 3.19 shows, a much lower satisfaction ratings are received by barangay officials (17%) and local government officials (5%), with negative margins of -25% and -50% respectively.

Comparable to the ratings of trustworthiness, institutions and personalities related with the military receive better performance satisfaction ratings than the civilian government institutions. Above majority performance satisfaction ratings are received by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (54%) and the Department of National Defense (51%) as well as the heads of these institutions: General Renato de Villa (54%) and Secretary Fidel Ramos (50%) (see table 3.20).

on certain issues

The political leadership is further rated in terms of its performance on national problems and issues (see table 3.21).

1. More than seven out of ten respondents feel extreme dissatisfaction on the performance of the administration on issues involving land reform (92%), fighting graft and corruption in government (89%), solving the problem of large foreign debts (84%), fulfillment of promises (77%), the delivery of basic services (77%), responding quickly to the problems of the country (75%), and protecting the natural environment (74%).

2. Also, about two-thirds of the respondents are dissatisfied of the government's action related to: the adverse effects of the oil price increase due to the Gulf conflict (67%), bringing about a more peaceful society (67%), minimizing crime (64%), developing livelihood opportunity for citizens (63%), weakening insurgency movements like those of the CPP-NPA and MNLF (61%), responding to the complaints and needs of government personnel (60%), and acting to what the people want (60%).

3. Further, about a majority of the respondents are dissatisfied with government's response to: the needs and complaints of farmers (59%), the needs and complaints of workers (58%), tax collection (58%), the needs and complaints of Filipino contract workers displaced in the Gulf conflict (58%), providing justice (57%), the needs and complaints of earthquake victims (52%), and providing discipline in the military, especially among those soldiers who participated in the attempts to stabilize the present government (43%).

4. Overall, very few (9%) express satisfaction on the performance of President Aquino herself, with about two-thirds of the respondents (66%) clearly dissatisfied. Even much less (5%) are satisfied and more dissatisfied (73%) when asked about the overall performance of the Aquino administration.

The negative margins of satisfaction on all 24 issues, which range from a low of -33% to a high of -88%, express the extreme disappointment of the respondents of the performance of the administration.

In concluding this section of regime legitimacy, it is apparent that the regime suffers not only from low civil legitimacy but more so with performance legitimacy. The low satisfactory performance ratings of top government institutions and personalities attest to this. Much lower ratings are accorded President Aquino and the national administration vis-a-vis their performance on specific national problems and issues.

Military intervention in politics is defined as "The armed forces' constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities." To intervene the military must have both the disposition and opportunity.

A 'disposition to intervene' involves "a combination of conscious motive and of a will or desire to act." It means the propensity and capacity of the military to intervene in politics. In this study, it has as indicators: motive, mood, and self-division of the military.

4.1 The Motive to Intervene

The motive and the mood look into why the military might or might not wish to intervene. The motive to intervene will be indicated in terms of the respondents' perceptions of national, corporate and individual interests. Specifically, self-perceptions of their role in national security and development will be discussed. The mood to intervene will be indicated primarily in terms of the respondents' grievances vis-a-vis the civilian regime.

4.11 The Perceptions of National

Interest

The military that have been politicized hold a belief that "they have some special and indeed unique identification with the 'national interest.'" This section aims to find out the perceptions of the respondents of their roles to protect the national interest.

The Philippine military performs multi-functional roles in national security. Although its primary function is to provide for external defense, it is also involved in an extensive constabulary and developmental activities. Its constabulary function includes the preservation of internal security against subversion and the maintenance of peace and order. It is similarly involved in developmental tasks particularly in support of civil agencies, such as the employment of military engineer units in insurgency-prone areas.

Its role is made more significant in its participation in the transition from authoritarian rule both as a restorer and preserver of the democratic process.

To find out the self-perceptions of their roles in society, the respondents were asked to rate the importance of ten indicators of national security and development consisting of a mix of political, economic and social indicators (see table and chart 4.1).

1. Rated almost unanimously by all respondents (99%) as the most important indicator is the one related to a secure environment in which the peace and order conditions have improved a lot, particularly in terms of lower crime rates and fewer armed encounters between the military and rebel groups.

2. Equally rated as next important by almost all respondents (98%) are three economic and political indicators: (a) a sustained national economic growth, lower rates of inflation and increasing incomes for most people; (b